One Court, different mindsets: The dismissal of Priya Pillai’s petition on criminal defamation

It is often said that the Supreme Court of India is not one court but fifteen different courts sitting in Benches of two judges each. And while it is true that individual prejudices and social, political and economic philosophies of judges inadvertently play a role in decision making, it is not too often that one Bench changes course midway in a particular case, and takes a decision contrary to what had been expressed by another Bench..This was exactly what happened on January 9 in court room 11 before a Bench of Justices AK Goel and UU Lalit. The Bench disposed of a case in stark contrast to the inclination expressed by the earlier Bench to hear the matter..But first some background..The petitioner in the case was Greenpeace activist Priya Pillai. Mahan Coal Limited, a joint venture between Essar Power Limited and Hindalco, had filed criminal defamation cases against Pillai. This, Pillai had alleged, was an attempt to derail her work with the local population against the proposed mining activities of Mahan Coal by cutting down forests..Pillai moved the Supreme Court in 2015 challenging the validity of Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code which pertain to criminal defamation. Pillai had also sought the quashing of the pending defamation proceedings against her. On August 7, 2015 the Court had issued notice in that case and stayed the trial court proceedings..It so happened that Pillai’s petition was one of several petitions challenging the vires of Sections 499 and 500. The Court, therefore, posted Pillai’s case for hearing after the other petitions were decided..On May 13, 2016, the Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of both S. 499 and S. 500..Nearly four months later, on September 5 Pillai’s petition came up for hearing before Justices JS Khehar and Arun Mishra. On that day, the petitioner confined herself to the issue of whether corporate entities can file criminal defamation suits..In other words, if corporate entities have no ‘right to life’ under Article 21, could they claim a right to reputation? This issue is found in second explanation to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code..The said explanation reads,.“Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.”.The Bench remarked that it would hear the matter on this limited issue and granted eight weeks to the Respondents, Central government and Essar, to file a response. Thereafter, the case came up for hearing two more times before the same Bench and it was adjourned on both occasions as Essar sought time to file counter affidavit..The Court then shut for winter break..And that is when things changed!.After the Court re-opened, Justice JS Khehar got elevated as the Chief Justice of India. The roster underwent a change and the matter got listed before a new Bench – Justice AK Goel and Justice UU Lalit..When it came up for hearing on January 9, this Bench proceeded to dispose of the case by way of a curt order..The order reads:.“Heard..In view of the judgment of this Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India – (2016) 7 SCC 221, we are not inclined to go into the validity of provisions of Sections 499 and 500 of the I.P.C. again. However, it is open to the parties to take appropriate remedies at appropriate forum in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”.This was in stark contrast to the stance of the earlier Bench. If nothing remained in the case after Subramanian Swamy judgment of May 13, then why did the earlier Bench allow time to the respondents on three occasions to file its response?.The earlier Bench had sought a response from the Respondents in spite of the ruling in Subramanian Swamy. In fact, the sole point of examination that remained was whether corporate entities enjoyed a right to reputation. Once this limited issue was laid out, one would expect the apex court to deliver a detailed verdict as opposed to a two-line dismissal order..Besides the considerable judicial time spent by the earlier Bench, the time and effort by the litigants and their lawyers also went in vain when the new Bench proceeded to dismiss the case..Of course, this is not the first time that a change in Bench composition in Supreme Court had led to unexpected twists..Take the Nirbhaya matter for example. When the matter came up for the first time in Supreme Court before a Bench of Justices BS Chauhan and Jasti Chelameswar in April 2014, Justice Chelameswar had remarked that the court would not interfere with the judgment of the High court if the dying declaration of the victim is found to be satisfactory..“We won’t re-conduct the trial”, he had remarked..The matter had subsequently been placed before a 3-judge Bench since, amendment to the Supreme Court rules mandated that “every case, appeal or other proceedings arising out of a case in which death sentence has been confirmed or awarded by the High Court shall be heard by a Bench consisting of not less than three Judges” (Rule 3 of Order VI)..In sharp contrast from the stance of the earlier Bench hearing the matter, a 3-judge Bench presided by Justice Dipak Misra said that it will afford full opportunity to the convicts to present their case and would hear the matter “like a trial judge”. The hearing in the matter is yet to be concluded..The above instances are rare but not isolated..Many a time, judges hold different opinions on legal questions, which is good, since individual opinion and dissent is a vital part of an independent judiciary. Sometimes these different opinions find place in the form of dissenting opinions; and there have been more than a few outstanding dissents in the apex court..However, when one Bench takes one stance and another Bench has a diametrically opposite view in the same case, does judicial propriety not demand that the Bench hear out such cases and pass speaking orders instead of dismissing such matters outright?.Justice must not only be done but also seem to be done!.Read the orders of the two Benches of the Supreme Court below.