Courts are institutions tasked to adjudicate and not to legislate: Calcutta High Court on when judicial inquiry is warranted

The courts in this country, including the High Courts, are institutions tasked to adjudicate and not to legislate, said the Calcutta High Court recently, while commenting on the limited extent to which a High Court can interfere in matters of State policy under Article 226 of the Constitution (Subhasis Negel and ors. v. The State of West Bengal & ors)..It is trite law that any relief sought under Article 226 is a discretionary remedy and such discretion needs to be exercised by the Court only on “sound judicial principles”, the High Court emphasised. .Justice Shekhar B Saraf further observed that one such established principle is "the non-inclination of Courts to interfere in any policy matter/decision taken by the State, under its judicial review powers prescribed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.".After referring to a host of case laws, the judge formulated the following guiding principles:.The scope of judicial enquiry when it comes to policy decisions or matters of the State is restricted to the “sole dimension” of whether such policy decision/matter is either (i) against any statutory provision; (ii) violative of any fundamental rights of a citizen; (iii) in the teeth of any Constitutional provision; (iv) manifestly arbitrary/discriminatory or (v) based on irrelevant consideration.Only the “legality” of the policy decision, and not the wisdom of soundness of such decision can be a subject-matter fit for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.Constitutional Courts ought to be hesitant in interfering in matters of such policy or the day-to-day functioning of any departments of the government or any statutory bodies.Negligible interference should be there by the courts in policy decisions when such decisions are the outcome of deliberations of technical experts. This is because courts lack the expertise to determine the basis/factors based on which such decisions might have been taken. This is also inclusive of “economic policies”..The petitioners before the Court in this case had sought directions so that they would be allowed to apply for the post of assistant teacher, against a notification originally issued in 2016, with enhanced qualifications..The 2016 selection process had earlier been set aside by another Bench of the Court, which had also directed that the selection process be held afresh on the basis of the 2016 advertisement. .Pertinently, the advertisement itself had not been set aside and the authorities had been asked to conduct the selection process afresh with the candidates found eligible as per the original advertisement. .The petitioners had approached the Court in hopes that their qualifications enhanced after the 2016 notification would also be considered when the selection process is done again. .Appearing for the petitioners, Senior Advocate Biswaroop Bhattacharya argued that it is the responsibility of the recruiting authority to get the best talent available in the market. As such, the petitioners' proposal was in furtherance of public interest, he contended. .Additionally, he added that the High Court has sufficient powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to mould the job advertisement so that the enhanced qualifications may be considered. The plea was opposed by the West Bengal Central School Service Commission, represented by Advocate Chapales Bandyopadhyay..While Justice Saraf found the petitioners' contentions well thought out and well-argued, he opined that they were unfortunately, against the well-founded principles established in law..It was noted that the Supreme Court has already ruled that the State authorities have the right to fix cut-off dates in such matters, which also include dates to adjudge eligibility criteria and the qualification of a candidate. "Exceptions cannot be culled out on sympathetic grounds or on grounds of public policy that the best persons should be recruited", Justice Saraf said. .He went on to remark, "The sophistry of the arguments of Mr. Bhattacharya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, especially those in relation to the wholesome and unbridled power of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has indeed caused my grey cells to be taxed ferociously and I have pondered over this several times. However, on contemplation, I am of the view that one cannot lose sight of the fact that the courts in this country including the High Courts, are institutions tasked to adjudicate and not to legislate."..Therefore, the Court dismissed the writ petitions, while adding that if the petitioners' prayer were allowed it would be unfair to those not before the Court, apart from being "an erroneous step in encroaching into the domain of the executive branch of the government.".Read the order: