The Delhi High Court in Review: September, 2019 [Part I]

With its vast and varied case-docket, the Delhi High Court has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief overview of the important pronouncements of the Delhi High Court rendered over the course of the month. While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity..Below are the judgments from the Delhi High Court for the month of September, segregated as per practice areas..Arbitration.In NCERT v. Skywing,[1] the Court interpreted the un-amended Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’) and held that when an award was silent as to the post-award/future rate of interest then it would be deemed that the award has stipulated payment of future interest @ 18% p.a..In SBS Logistics Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. SBS Transpole Logistics Private Limited,[2] the Court observed that the manner of granting of adjournments and the conditions imposed in relation thereto, unless completely outrageous and unconscionable, cannot be a ground for refusing enforcement of a foreign award under Section 47 of the Arbitration Act. The Court further noted that a clause in the agreement providing for seeking recourse to negotiations to resolve the dispute amicably before proceeding for arbitration could not be used as a weapon to delay the arbitration proceedings and strict adherence to the same could not be considered a sine qua non when earlier discussions between the parties had already evidenced the complete lack of a common meeting-ground between the parties..In UOI v. G.L. Litmus Events Pvt. Ltd.,[3] the Court observed that it was within the remit of the arbitral tribunal to invoke the principle of estoppel by conduct, which is a rule of evidence, even though waiver in terms of a contractual provision may not be strictly attracted..In Oil Industry Development Board v. Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd,[4] the Court reiterated that it was not necessary for a party raising a counterclaim to put the other party on notice of the same prior to the arbitration proceedings or to issue a formal notice invoking arbitration qua the said counterclaim..In M/s Makro v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.,[5] the Court held that a defense premised upon a full and final settlement of disputes could not be used as a shield to defeat a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator in view of the amended Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act..While elaborating upon the methodology of calculation of the three month period of limitation provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in Ministry of Health And Family Welfare & Anrs .v. Hosmac Projects Division of Hosmac India Pvt. Ltd.,[6] the Court reiterated that when an application under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act is disposed of, then it is the date of disposal that would be the starting point of limitation and not the date of receipt of the said decision. Further, in the facts of circumstances of the said case, the Court held that after excluding the actual date of the decision of the application under Section 33, if the starting date of limitation was to be reckoned from 10th January 2019, then as per the correct methodology of calculation, the corresponding date of the expiry of the three-month period would be 9th April, 2019 and not 10th April, 2019..In Haji Banda Hasan v. Gupta & Gupta Pvt. Ltd.,[7] the Court reiterated that a huge delay in re-filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act cannot be condoned as it would indirectly defeat the objective of providing for a strict outer-limit under Section 34(3) for mounting a challenge to an Arbitral Award..In Jes & Ben Groupo Pvt. Ltd. & Ors v. Hell Energy MagyarorzagKft. (Hell Energy Hungry Ltd.) &Anr.,[8] the Court held that an allegation of purported unequal bargaining power could not be used to escape from an arbitration agreement providing for the reference of disputes to a foreign-seated arbitration, and a suit filed in relation to the same subject matter would be liable to be rejected and the parties referred to arbitration..In the Chief General Manager, (Contracts), M/s Neyvelli Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Driplex Water Engineering Ltd. & Anr.,[9] while reiterating that Section 18 of the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development (‘MSMED’) Act, 2006 (‘MSMED Act’) would override the arbitration agreement between the parties, further held that a failure to comply with the pre-arbitration mechanism stipulated under the agreement would not be a bar to invoking the remedy under the MSMED Act..In APM Air Cargo Terminal Services & Anr. v. Celebi Delhi Cargo Terminal Management India Private Limited & Anr.,[10] the Court rejected a petition under Section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as not maintainable when no arbitration agreement could be demonstrated to be in existence between the parties, and held that neither was there a specific signed document incorporating an arbitration clause nor was the existence of an arbitration agreement evident from exchange of communications and pleadings between the parties..In Union of India v. M/s. JCB India Ltd.[11] the Court held that the outer limit for filing a challenge to an award under Section 34(3) of Arbitration Act, could not be sought to be extended by a subsequent filing before a wrong forum when the initial filing was itself beyond the outer-limit stipulated, and that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’) would not come to the rescue of the aggrieved party in such a case..In Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. FEPL Engineering Private Limited & Anr.,[12] the Court held that where the agreement provided for jurisdiction of the courts at New Delhi and the venue of the arbitration also to be at New Delhi, then the mere presence of an available blank space wherein the parties were given an option to fill in some other place as the choice of venue and for exclusive jurisdiction of the courts would not mean that there was uncertainty regarding selection of New Delhi as the court which would have jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act..The Court in Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Anil Bhasin,[13] while rejecting a challenge to an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, proceeded to issue directions to constitute an enquiry into the lapses on the part of the authorities concerned which formed the basis of the adverse findings in the award, and which resulted in significant outflow of public money..Banking & Finance.In Hassad Food Company Q.S.C. v. Reliance Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors.,[14] the Court while considering the submission that the aggrieved party having allegedly been the victim of a fraud was entitled to a complete waiver of the pre-deposit requirement under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (‘Debts and Bankruptcy Act’), rejected the said prayer while holding that the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal is not vested with any discretion under the provisions of the Act to waive the pre-deposit..Civil Procedure.In Sukruti Dugal v. Jahnavi Dugal & Ors.,[15] the Court held that an application for amendment of the suit under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) is maintainable even after the filing of an application for rejection of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. In such a situation, it was held that the application for amendment would be taken up first by the Court. The Court further held that if the amendment sought for was declined, then the application under Order VII Rule 11 as originally filed would be considered, and if the amendment was to be allowed, then it would have to be considered if the grounds urged in the application under Order VII Rule 11 would survive or not in light of the amended pleadings..In Anant Verinder Singh (Deceased) Thr Lr. v. Col. Inderjeet Singh (Deceased) Thr Lr.,[16] the Court held that even where a suit should have been tried by the district court as per valuation, the High Court would not be powerless to entertain and dispose of such a suit, and an objection to the execution of a decree so passed by the High Court cannot be accepted on this ground..In M/s. Banwari Lal Charitable Trust & Anr. v. Vireshwar Prasad Jain & Anr.,[17] the Court reiterated the proposition that in a compromise decree the obligations cast upon the different parties are separate and independent of each other and not inter-dependent..The Court in GS Gupta (Deceased) Thr Lrs v. Chet Ram Gupta (Deceased) Thr Lrs.,[18] held that when an application for amendment of the plaint had been filed even prior to the recording of the evidence, however, the same had been kept pending, then it was impermissible for the trial court to have considered and allowed the same after the recording of evidence and at the stage of final arguments..While determining the contours of a prime facie case against dispossession, the Court in Focus Combine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Haryana State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation Ltd. & Anr.,[19] held that a sub-lessee could not be endowed with a right beyond that which was granted to the lessee by the owner of the property, and lease deeds in derogation thereto were prima-facie unenforceable and inconsequential..The Court in Harjeet Kaur Chaudhary (Senior Citizen) v. Dashmesh Arts (India) Ltd. & Ors.,[20] held that in a suit for recovery of money, when it was established that the money was received by the concerned defendant in an account maintained in a branch located within the territorial jurisdiction of the court concerned, then part cause of action would have arisen within the meaning of Section 21(c) of the CPC..In Jay Kant Mishra v. M/s. S Chand & Company Ltd. &Ors.,[21] the Court held that a suit filed to set aside a decree passed by the Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (‘DRCA’) would be barred by res-judicata if the issues which are sought to be agitated involving the same parties have already been pronounced upon in the order passed by the Rent Controller. Another argument pertaining to res judicata was considered by the Court in Jiley Singh @ Ziley Singh & Ors v. Neelam Devi & Ors.[22] and the Court held that the dismissal on the ground of limitation of an earlier suit seeking permanent injunction from dispossession would not operate as res-judicata so as to bar a subsequent suit which had come to be filed seeking to be put back into possession by making a claim for ownership pursuant to dispossession from the suit property. However, in Vinod Madan Lal Nawandhar v. Vidisha Garg and Ors.,[23] the Court noted that a mere plea that a new cause of action had arisen subsequently would not absolve the plaintiff from the rigor of the principles of res-judicata and the suit would be barred if it was found that the purported fresh cause of action directly emanated from, and is intrinsically linked, to the issues conclusively determined in the earlier suit or proceeding..In Kasturi Lal Sachdeva (Since Deceased) Thru Lrs. v. Mohinder Pal,[24] the Court reiterated that the rejection of the plaint in exercise of the power under Order VII Rule 11 is a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the CPC and is, therefore, appealable against under Section 96 of the CPC..The Court in Mohd. Tahir v. Khwaja Syed Mohd. Mehdi Nizami,[25] held that the appointment of a local commissioner to assist the court in ascertaining the actual position of the property on the ground level cannot be said as amounting to assisting one of the parties in collecting evidence..The Court in Narayan Kumar v. Kamal Kishore Gupta,[26] reiterated that it is mandatory to issue a show cause notice to a party before exercising arrest and detention powers under Order XXI Rule 37 of the CPC..In the context of Section 2(9) of Benami Transaction Act, 1988 (‘Benami Act’) the Court in Neeraj v. Kamlesh,[27] upheld a judgment on admissions passed under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and held that when a defense was explicitly impermissible in terms of the said provision, then there was no illegality in refusing to permit the matter to be set down for trial to grant an opportunity to establish the said defense..In Rajesh Kumar Singh v. Amar Sinha,[28] the Court reiterated that once the defendant’s right to contest the suit had been closed, then only a very limited right to cross examine the plaintiff’s witnesses was available to the respondent and the said limited right could not be sought to be converted into a full blown presentation of the defendant’s case..The Court in Shyamji Mehrotra v. Shipra Mehrotra,[29] held that the general rule that advocates representing parties cannot verify pleadings on their behalf is also applicable to proceedings under Section 47 of the CPC..In M/s SS Steel Industry v. M/s Shri Guru Hargobind Steels,[30] the Court held on an interpretation of Order XXXVII Rule 2(3) of the CPC it was impermissible for a court adjudicating a summary suit to revisit the question of whether the suit falls within the definition of a summary suit once summons in the prescribed form have been issued and the defendant has failed to appear within the statutory period inasmuch as upon such non-appearance the averments in the plaint are deemed to be admitted and a decree is required to be passed forthwith..In Intertek India Pvt. Ltd. v. Priyanka Mohan,[31] the Court while upholding the dismissal of an application filed for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, held that even though the prayer in the plaint is somewhat nebulous, when the essence of the prayer is declaration of termination of a service contract for the purpose inter-alia of claiming damages, then it cannot be said that the relief sought was that of reinstatement and therefore, barred by law..In Shri Jaipal Chand Jain v. Shri Manoj Kumar Singh,[32] the court decreed a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the CPC on the basis of certain promissory notes while rejecting the defense that the interest rates reflecting in the notes had been subsequently filled in. The Court noted that when the defendant itself had subsequent to the execution of the promissory notes paid interest consistently at the said rates to the plaintiff, then the defense would be a clear moonshine..In M/S KSS-KSSIIPL Consortium v. GAIL India Ltd,[33] the Court while allowing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, held that when the Supreme Court while deciding an earlier litigation between the same parties, viz. a petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, had held the claim of the plaintiff to be unsustainable on the merits and had accordingly refused reference to arbitration, then there was no discernable surviving cause of action..In Mohinder Jeet Singh v. BMW India Pvt Ltd & Ors.,[34] the Court noted that while ordering a deletion of a party under Order I Rule 9, the court concerned could not enter into an analysis of the evidence and such an aspect should be reserved for trial..In M/s. Parkland Properties Ltd v. New Rajput Cooperative Group Housing Society,[35] the Court emphasized that a defendant who had already suffered a summary decree could not be allowed to re-agitate issues which it should have contested on the merits, under the garb of an application under Order XXXVII Rule 4 of the CPC..In Neety Gupta v. Usha Gupta & Ors,[36] the Court observed that once an appellate decree has been passed, then the decree of the trial court merges with the same and thereafter no amendment can be sought of the decree passed by the trial court. The amendment, if any, has to be sought of the appellate decree..In Cypress Fincap Private Limited v. Vyogiswami Financial Consultants Limited & Ors.,[37] the Court held that though a dishonored cheque drawn by a company furnishes a cause of action for instituting a summary suit against the said company under Order XXXVII of the CPC, however, no such entitlement could be claimed against its directors or shareholders who are separate and distinct legal entities..In Rajesh Sabharwal v. Rajasavi Estate & Deveopers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.[38], the Court held that in the absence of a requisite affidavit in terms of Order XXI Rule 9(a) of the CPC having been filed, an application for arrest and detention in civil prison of the judgment debtors would not lie..In Frankfinn Aviation Services (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mr. Rahul Chauhan & Ors,[39] the Court cautioned that settlement agreements resulting in disposal of suits under which further actions are required to be taken thereunder should provide for clear consequences of violation of the settlement so that an executable decree can be rendered if the situation so arises..While reiterating that the mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to the said document having been proved, the Court in Prakash Oil Corporation & Anr. v. Brij Kishan,[40] held that to strike a balance between the right of a party which is objecting to the very admissibility of certain documents at the preliminary stage on the one hand and the requirement of a fair trial on the other, it would be apt to allow objections in relation to the exhibited documents to be reflected in the statement of a witness and thereafter, to permit cross-examination without prejudice to the objections raised. Thereafter, at the stage of final arguments, the Court could at the outset take a decision on which documents were to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding the suit..Commercial Courts.In M/s. PSA Nitrogen Limited. v. Maeda Corporation & Ors.,[41] the Court clarified that the time for filing a written statement in response to a counterclaim in a suit would begin to run only from the date on which the counterclaim is specifically registered in terms of Order IV Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC, and consequent service of summons. The Court proceeded to issue a slew of directions to the district courts regarding specific registration of counterclaims and issuance of summons thereof..In Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd. v. Saregama India Ltd,[42] the Court elaborated upon the detailed and specialized regime for filing of documents in a commercial suit, and held that as opposed to an ordinary suit, in a commercial suit there is an embargo under Order XI Rule 15 which prevents reliance on documents which were in the plaintiffs power, possession, control or custody and not disclosed with the plaint. Though the lifting of such an embargo is possible in certain cases, there is an extremely heavy onus that the plaintiff is required to discharge to succeed on this count, including adducing actual proof of the explanation for non-production of the document along with the plaint..Company Law and Insolvency .In Sicom Ltd. v. Hanung Toys & Textiles Ltd.,[43] the Court had occasion to consider the permissibility of transfer of pending winding up petitions before it to the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’). The Court arrived at the ultimate conclusion that a wide discretion has been granted to the High Court to transfer matters to the NCLT at the request of a party. It was held that where the official liquidator had been appointed as a liquidator, then a stricter view should be taken of a request for transfer inasmuch as a large amount of time and resources would already have been expended to consolidate, evaluate and auction the assets of the Company, which process would again be duplicated upon transfer of the petition to the NCLT. In contrast, however, the Court held that where the official liquidator had only been appointed as the provisional liquidator, then considering the initial stage of the exercise, the Court would ordinarily transfer the petition to the NCLT..In Consortium of Worlds Window Exim Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Axis Bank Ltd. &Ors.,[44] it was held that though the circular dated 12.02.2018 issued by the Reserve Bank of India was quashed by the Supreme Court in the judgment in Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Limited v. UOI & Ors.,[45] the same would not impact the exercise of statutory and contractual rights by a creditor as those are independent of, and in addition to, the right provided by the quashed circular..Competition Law.The Court in Competition Commission of India v. Grasim Industries Limited,[46] held that there was an expansive power of investigation available with the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) once an order under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 (‘Competition Act’) had been passed and the powers of the Director-General are not limited to examining only those matters which formed the subject matter of the original complaint and could expand onto larger issues. The Court further explained the difference between the stage of adducing evidence at the stage of investigation before the Director-General and at the subsequent stage of consideration of the Director General’s report by the CCI, and held that there is no such principle that even at the stage of investigation, the aggrieved party had the right to adduce evidence as if it was participating in a full-fledged trial replete with cross-examination etc..In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India,[47] the Court considered the issue as to whether a party was liable to pay interest to the CCI on account of delay in making payment of the penalty levied upon it. The Court held that the levy of interest was perfectly valid in the light of provision thereto in Regulation 5 of the Competition Commission of India (Manner of Recovery of Monetary Penalty) Regulations, 2011. The Court further held that once the appeal against the order passed by the Competition Commission had been finally rejected, then the period in the interregnum when the order was stayed by the appellate forum would not be excluded for the purpose of calculation of interest..Constitutional Law.In Chanderwati Educational & Charitable Trust v. National Commission For Minority Education Institutions & Anr.,[48] the Court construed Article 30 of the Constitution and Section 2(g) of the National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 (‘Minority Institutions Act’) and held that the same would include in its ambit a minority institution which though originally not falling within the said definition, witnesses a change in its status on account of the takeover of the ownership through permissible means by a minority community from a non-minority community..The Court in Kishan Chand & Ors. v. Chief Executive National Cooperative Union Of India,[49] held that inasmuch as it could not be shown that the national cooperative union was under direct supervision and control of the central or state government nor was it being run primarily through funds provided therefrom, it could not be said that the national cooperative union was an instrumentality of the state and therefore, amenable to writ jurisdiction..The court in Suraz India Trust v. Union of India[50] observed that once the Supreme Court had barred an individual from filing Public Interest Litigations in any court, then Article 144 of the Constitution of India would enjoin the High Court to refuse to entertain a Public Interest Litigation instituted by the said individual..In Sonal Saroha v. High Court of Delhi & Anr.,[51] the High Court rejected a challenge to the determination of the age eligibility for appearing in the Delhi Judicial Service Examination on the ground that ascertainment of the cut-off date on the first day of January following the date of commencement of the exam was arbitrary and would exclude a large pool of candidates. The Court observed that fixation of a date for determining age eligibility is always likely to adversely affect one or the other class of individuals and this by itself would not be ground for interfering with the said determination. The Court held that in the overall context of the fact that the Delhi Judicial Service Examination is a three-tier process comprising of multiple stages and stretching over a period of six months from the date of issuance of the advertisement, the fixation of the cut-off date in the said case as the first day of January after the commencement of the exam could not be held to be arbitrary..In Shanti Ranjan v. Union of India & Ors.,[52] while dealing with another constitutional challenge to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 (‘DHJS Rules’) on the ground that there was no provision for age relaxation for scheduled caste candidates, the Court while reiterating earlier decisions that had considered the said issue, held that in the absence of a provision for age-relaxation no inherent right could be claimed to the same..Consumer Protection and Real Estate Regulation.In M3M India Pvt Ltd & Anr. V. Dr. Dinesh Sharma & Anr., [53] the Court held that the remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (‘COPRA’) and the Real Estate (Development and Regulation) Act, 2016 (‘RERA’) are concurrent in nature..Contract Law.After an exhaustive discussion, the Court in Modicare Limited v. Gautam Bali & Ors.[54] held that merely because a claim was founded in the tort of unlawful interference with business, the same would not validate the restraint of trade sought against certain ex-employees of the company in question inasmuch as Sections 23 and 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (‘Contract Act’) would prevail over the principle of tort. The Court further reiterated that the right saved by Section 27 of the Contract Act was in-fact reflective of the fundamental right available under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and such a fundamental right could even otherwise not sought to be circumscribed by reference to the law of tort..Cooperative Law .In Ravindra Kumar Hajela v Registrar of Cooperative Society & Ors.,[55] the Court declined to entertain a writ petition challenging the elections to the Management Committee of a cooperative society inasmuch as there was a clear alternative remedy available under Sections 70 & 71 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 (‘DCSA’) as per which the Registrar of Cooperative Societies would be the appropriate forum for deciding such disputes..In Sarita Gupta v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies & Anr.,[56] the Court held that even where the Registrar had failed to decide a claim petition within the period provided under Section 70(3) of the DCSA, then the Registrar is always competent to decide the said dispute under Section 71(1)(a) of the DCSA when automatic reference of the same is made to him/her..Criminal Law and Procedure.In State v. Mohit Kumar & Ors.,[57] while examining a case under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences 2012 Act (‘POCSO Act’), the Court refused to interfere with an order of acquittal when there were material discrepancies and inconsistencies in the statement of the prosecutrix and held that the mere fact that the accused was the biological father of the children of the prosecutrix would no ipso-facto establish the alleged forcible nature of the sexual intercourse..In Dharmendra Kumar Tandon v. State,[58] the Court observed that once an accused volunteers to give evidence under Section 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P.C.) as a defense witness, then he/she is subject to all liabilities of an ordinary witness including the liability for giving false evidence and such a witness is not entitled to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and to refuse to answer an incriminating question. The Court concluded by observing that in such circumstances, if the evidence of the accused is found to be false, then it is a relevant circumstance which shall be weighed against the accused..In Court on its Own Motion v. Aman Lohia & Ors.,[59] the Court held that the conduct of a father who procured a second passport from a foreign country for his minor child, despite having deposited the minor child’s Indian passport with the Registry of the High Court, and subsequently flew to a country where the concerned personal laws enjoined exclusive custody upon the father, amounted to criminal contempt and was also a case of child abduction attracting Sections 360, 361, 363 & 365 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’)..In Jai Shankar v. State,[60] the Court elaborated upon the guidelines for appreciation of a dying declaration and held inter-alia that even when the deceased had suffered severe injuries, in this case, the burn victim having suffered 99% burns, a dying declaration can be relied upon if it was established that the deceased was in a fit state of mind when the said dying declaration was made..While examining the purport of Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., the Court in Runeet Gulathi v. State,[61] reiterated that though an accused has a right to keep silent or dispute the incriminating circumstances put to him/her in the course of interaction with the Court, a failure to give an explanation regarding incriminating material will entitle the court to draw an adverse inference. The Court further held that ocular testimonies are to be given precedence over medical evidence while appreciating evidence..In Raj Singh v. State,[62] the Court observed that when injuries to the accused persons had been sufficiently explained, in the present case on account of stone-pelting by a mob, then there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecution case..In Ashok v. State,[63] while examining the validity of police records presented during a trial, the Court reiterated that there is a presumption that official police acts have been performed in a regular manner and when a statement is made by a police officer as to the mode and manner of recovery of a certain article, then the burden is cast upon the accused to demonstrate, through cross-examination or other material, that the said statement is unworthy of reliance..In State v. Jaffar Khan,[64] while convicting the accused of offences under Sections 6, 10 & 12 of the POCSO Act, the Court observed that with the evolution of the law governing cases of rape, the current position is that evidence of injuries is not a sine-qua-non for proving penetrative sexual assault..In State v. Hawan Pratap Singh @ Pappi & Anr.,[65] the Court while upholding an order of acquittal reiterated the importance of CCTV footage as being one of the best pieces of evidence available during a criminal trial..In Vijay Kumar @ Babloo v. State,[66] the Court held that recovery of the weapon of offence from a public place would not render the statement of the accused as inadmissible in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act..In Asha Rathore v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.[67] the Court held that the principle enshrined in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (‘JJ Act’) for ascertaining whether an individual is a juvenile or not, i.e. the preference given to a birth certificate issued by a school over that given by a corporation or a municipal authority, would apply irrespective of whether the person concerned is a victim of a crime or an accused of a crime..In Anwar@ Karamat v. State,[68] the Court held that even in the absence of a direct link, when recovery is made of an article which can be said to be duly connected with the offense of theft then it is for the accused to rebut the presumption which arises therefrom..In Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Manohar Singh & Ors, [69] the Court observed that even where a person was demonstrated to be otherwise ambulant, if it was established that he or she was unable to follow ordinary pursuits on account of the injury suffered for more than 20 days, the said injury would fall in the category of grievous hurt under Section 320 of the IPC..While refusing to quash a summoning order issued in relation to an alleged offence under Section 16 (1A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, (‘PFA Act’) the Court in Shri Praveen Chand v. Food Safety Officer[70] held that once it was not disputed that the aggrieved party before the Court was the official nominee of the Company concerned in terms of Section 17(2) of the PFA Act, then the alleged lack of personal knowledge and neglect on his part would be a matter of trial and no case was made out for interference at a preliminary stage..In Babu Khan & Ors. v. State & Anr.[71] the Court held that there was no blanket bar on the quashing of a FIR alleging the commission of offence under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code in exercise of power under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (‘Cr.P.C.’), on the basis of settlement arrived at between the accused and victims. The Court opined that a relevant fact to be considered in the said situation would be whether the facts would disclose the presence of elements of gross negligence and mens-rea which would then secure a conviction..In Financial Intelligent Unit- Ind v. Kotak Mahindra Bank,[72] the Court noted that once the financial intelligence unit of the internal department of revenue had closed proceedings against the bank on account of the failure to report attempted suspicious transactions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’) by issuing a warning, then the subsequent imposition of a fine for the same offence on a much later date was impermissible and liable to be quashed..In Financial Intelligent Unit-Ind v. Corporation Bank &Anr.,[73]the Court examined an important aspect as to whether Section 13 of the PMLA which provided for lesser punitive measures could be said to apply retrospectively. The Court held that as the reduced punishments were beneficial to the accused, therefore, in terms of the rule of beneficial construction the said amended provision should be held to apply retrospectively..In State v. Rajesh Kumar[74] the Court noted that in order to bring a home a charge under Section 279 read with Section 304A of the IPC, the exact location of the incident would be material inasmuch as negligence part of the accused could be conclusively established only if it was shown that the victim was crossing the road at a zebra crossing and not if the victim was crossing the road at some other point..In Ajay Marwah v. State & Anr.,[75] the Court reiterated that in a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’) the defense taken by the accused at the stage of framing of notice under Section 251 of the Cr. P.C. and the explanation tendered while recording the statement under Section 281 and under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. cannot be treated as evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’)..In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Vallalore Rangaswamy Natarajan[76] the Court held that the summoning of the case diary for exclusive perusal of the Court cannot be directed in a routine manner..In Neeraj Mahajan v. Central Bureau of Investigation[77] the High Court discharged an alleged Vice-President of a cooperative group housing society inasmuch as it found that there was no specific charge or evidence that the said person had either siphoned off any amount or fraudulently allotted plots to persons close to him..In Mr. Deepak Talwar v. Enforcement Directorate[78] the Court held that in a case involving money laundering and economic offences, the argument that investigation qua one of the accused is complete is not sufficient to discharge the other accused on bail inasmuch as in such offences the magnitude of the crime is widespread and inter-linked with the actions of various parties qua whom the investigation would still be continuing..In Ashok v. State[79] the Court reiterated that even where witness turn hostile, it always open to the Court rely upon the dependable part of the testimony of said witness, and the testimony as a whole cannot be said to have been effaced. The Court further held that even though the establishment of motive is an important factor in a criminal trial, however, it cannot be said that on the account of the failure to establish motive alone the entire prosecution case would fall the ground..In Raghu Menon v. State,[80] one of the factors which prevailed with the Court in refusing bail to an accused in an economic offence was that the accused was the admitted creator and administrator of a Whatsapp group in which the allegedly illegal transactions were discussed and finalized..In Akash Tomar v. State (NCT) of Delhi,[81] the Court overturned a conviction inter-alia on the ground that there was a blatant inconsistency between the dates on which the investigative proceedings where conducted, and the actual dates which appeared on the exhibited documents and the FIR..In Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sanjeev Kumar & Anr.,[82] the Court held that the trial court erred in not exercising its wide powers under Section 311 of the Cr. P.C. to place on record a certificate under Section 65(b) of the Evidence Act through recall of certain witnesses in order to prove the CDs containing voice samples and voice recordings, inasmuch as the said CDs were already filed and placed on record even before the charges were framed and further been exhibited as part of the prosecution evidence without any objection having been taken at that stage by the accused..In Kailash v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi[83], the Court while expounding upon the elements for constituting an offence under Sections 279 and 304(a) of the IPC, held that when it was proved that the accused was driving a commercial vehicle in a rash and negligent manner on the wrong side of the road ultimately resulting in the death of the accused, then the aforesaid offences were clearly made out..In Priya Kapoor & Anr. v. State (NCT) of Delhi &Anr.,[84]the Court held that the alleged demand of dowry by the father of the co-accused, who was accused of establishing sexual relations on the promise to marry, would by itself not amount to criminal intimidation within the meaning of Section 506 of the IPC..In Sachi Jindal v. State[85] while directing supply of a copy to the accused of a video cassette prepared when the post-mortem examination was being conducted, it was observed that a document relied upon the prosecution is in the usual course always required to be provided to the accused..In Umesh Prasad v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) &Anr.,[86]while upholding a conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act, the Court rejected the argument that the cheque was given as security inasmuch as the admitted ‘loan receipt’ executed between the parties clearly demonstrated the existence of a loan..In Vijay Pal v. Shobha Devi[87] the Court reiterated that an estranged wife or a live-in partner are also eligible for grant of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C..In Digvijay Saroha v. State,[88] while declining the grant of bail in a prosecution under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (‘MCOCA’), the Court observed that if the nexus of the accused is established with an ‘organized crime syndicate’ or with an ‘organized crime’ then even in the absence of direct role, the ingredients of Section 3(2) of the MCOCA would prima-facie stand satisfied..In Rinku vs. State,[89] while upholding a conviction under the provisions of the POSCO, the Court rejected the argument of the accused that the counsellor had not been cited as a witness nor examined by the investigating agency, while observing that under the scheme of the POCSO Act, the counselling reports and notes of the counsellor are confidential in nature and, therefore, the same cannot be made a part of the evidence in the trial..In Ramesh Dutt Sharma v. Medical Council of India &Ors.,[90] the Court found fault with an order of the Medical Council of India (‘MCI’) absolving a doctor of the charges of criminal negligence inasmuch as the Court observed that the MCI had not examined the aspect as to what was the exact nature of the procedure actually performed on the patient and whether it differed significantly from the acceptable procedure in this regard. Having held so, the Court, however, noted that it was acceptable procedure for the police authorities to rely on the opinion rendered by the MCI or the appropriate State Medical Council while determining whether an FIR was required to be registered on the basis of the allegations made..In State v. Sandeep[91] the Court held that the breakdown of a romantic relationship involving sexual relations between two consulting adults, even if unilaterally actuated by one of the parties, would not constitute an offence under the IPC..In State v. Vicky[92] the Court commented adversely on the use of different terms to describe a gazetted officer inasmuch as the same has the potential to create confusion and cast doubt on the compliance with Section 50 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’)..In M/s. Daya Engineering Works (Sleeper) Ltd. &Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.,[93] the Court rejected a petition to quash a FIR under Section 120-B/420/467/468/471 of the IPC on the ground of a compromise having been entered into between the accused entity and the bank inasmuch as the Court found that the element of criminality which was inherent in the alleged actions of the accused company in falsifying the financial statements and opening unauthorized accounts was required to be tested in a trial, even though the civil liabilities may have been settled in terms of settlement. While doing so, the Court remarked that the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in B.B. Agarwal & Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.[94], upon which reliance had been placed by the accused, had failed to consider the earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation &Anr.[95] .In M/s/ DJB Infrastructures and Developers India Pvt. Ltd v. State &Anr.,[96] the Court noted that post the introduction of Section 446 of the Cr. P.C., bail would stand canceled automatically by the operation of said provision, even in the absence of an explicit order of cancellation..In P. Chidambaram v. Central Bureau of Investigation[97], the Court reiterated the special parameters which weigh with the Court while determining grant of bail in matters concerning economic offences, and proceeded to deny regular bail on the ground that the possibility of witnesses being influenced could not be ruled out..Click here to read all about Chidambaram’s case .While refusing to quash a summoning order issued in relation to an alleged offence under Section 16 (1A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (‘PFA Act’), the Court in Shri Praveen Chand v. Food Safety Officer[98] held that once it was not disputed that the aggrieved party before the Court was the official nominee of the Company concerned in terms of Section 17(2) of the PFA Act, then the alleged lack of personal knowledge and neglect on his part would be a matter of trial and no case was made out for interference at a preliminary stage. .Disability Law and Mental Health .The Court in R.S. v. State & Ors.[99] agreed with the submission that in view of Section 35 of the Mental Health Care Act, 2017 (‘Mental Health Act’), the mere ascertainment of a person’s mental illness would not be determinative of the fact that the person is of unsound mind, and a declaration to this effect would have to be passed by a competent court in appropriate proceedings..Education.The Court in Amitoj Singh v. Sardar Patel Vidyalaya, Lodi Estate & Ors.,[100] in the context of a minimum cut-off of 75 marks for opting for the mathematics subject, upheld the power of a school to fix a minimum criteria for admitting students to a particular stream, and held that the said exercise is not arbitrary in nature..In Kavash Khanna v. Faculty of Management Studies & Ors.,[101] the Court refused to take cognizance of a cut-off date for submission of results for the purpose of admission, when the said date did not find any mention in the information bulletin issued by the university laying down the eligibility criteria for the course in question..While considering the Homeopathy Central Council (Minimum Standards Requirement of Homeopathic Colleges and Attached Hospitals) Regulations 2013, the Court in Dr. R B Singh Gaya Homeopathic Medical College and Hospital v. Union Of India and Anr.,[102] held that the requirement of making available requisite cadavers is implicitly included therein and it was necessary for imparting instruction to students in the field of anatomy..In Shubhangi Sinha v. University Of Delhi & Anr.,[103] the Court came to the rescue of a student by interpreting the requirement to ‘update’ the qualifying degree marks on the web portal of the university as not requiring the student to re-affirm the original marks already indicated by her when there was no change in the same at any subsequent stage..In Beehive Ayurvedic Medical College And Hospital &Anr. v. Union Of India & Anr.,[104] the Court observed that in the matter of testing eligibility of an ayurvedic college to admit students, ordinarily the report furnished by the expert body should be relied upon to test eligibility and the same should not be overlooked unless very good reasons exist on the record to disregard the same..Election Law .In Narsing Goju Vishal & Ors. v. University Of Delhi Through Chief Election Officer &Ors.,[105] the Court in the context of university elections relied upon paragraph 6.8.4 of the Lyngdoh Committee’s Report and held that it was obligatory on the part of the grievance redressal cell set up in terms of the Lyngdoh Committee’s Report to act on the complaint of an aggrieved party within a period of 24 hours by either dismissing the grievance or calling for a hearing pursuant to the same..In Vandana v. Dwarka Court Bar Associates,[106] the Court held that an advocate can be said to be disqualified on the principle of ‘one bar one vote’ only if the said member has actually cast a vote in the election of a bar association other than the one of which he/she is sought to be disqualified from voting in, and a mere reflection of the name of the advocate in the voter list would not constitute a disqualification..Evidence.In CL Gupta & Ors.v. Kanwar Chand Saboo (Deceased) Thr Lrs & Ors.,[107] the Court held that the certified copy of a death certificate would be admissible in evidence without formal proof of the same in view of Sections 74 & 77 of the Evidence Act. In a similar vein, in Sudesh Arora v. Jagdish Raj Sagar,[108] the Court further held that the certified copy of a judgment or order of a court is also similarly admissible in evidence without any formal proof thereof and that the same could be produced for the first time even at the stage of arguments..Insurance and Motor Vehicles Act.While overturning a refusal to grant compensation for loss of earning capacity, the Court in Anand Singh v. Majoor Saha & Ors. (Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd.),[109] noted that even where the disability suffered is seemingly of a limited percentage, if the said limited disability has a larger impact in the context of the specific activity being engaged in by the insured, then, the functional disability to that extent is required to be compensated for. In a similar vein, the Court in Magma HDI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar &Anr.,[110] and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ramnik Singh & Ors.,[111] held that the real-world impact of the injury on the daily existence and functioning of the injured has to be taken into account while assessing the true nature of the functional disability suffered by him/her..In Deepa v. Chandrawati & Ors.,[112] the Court while underscoring the basic objective of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (‘MV Act’) held that where the vehicle owner has admitted that all rights in the vehicle stood transferred and that possession of the vehicle thereto had also been taken, the mere fact that the registered owner of the vehicle was a different person in the official records would not defeat the liability of the actual owner to pay compensation to the victim of a motor accident..In Giriya Devi v. Harender Kumar & Anr.,[113] the Court unequivocally rejected the submission that the driver of a three wheel scooter would not fall within the definition of a ‘driver’ within the meaning of the MV Act..In Kamruddin & Ors. (Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.) v. Subhash Chandra & Ors.,[114] the Court overruled the denial of compensation under Section 126 of the MV Act, which had been rejected on the ground that there was a delay of 3 days in registration of an FIR in relation to the accident which resulted in the death of the insured. The Court opined that the natural human response in the case of a grievous accident would be to insure the best possible medical care to the injured person and, thus, the delay in registration of the FIR would not by itself justify rejecting grant of compensation..The Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Nazhat Parveen &Ors.,[115] noted that merely because the injured is in permanent government employment, the same would not defeat the right to compensation on account of functional disability..In Reliance Gen INS Co. Ltd. v. Nanak Khemani & Ors.,[116]the Court noted that the failure of the owner of the offending vehicle to lodge a police complaint against the alleged unauthorized use of the vehicle by the driver would be a relevant factor in determining the liability of the owner..In Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kailash Mudgal & Ors.,[117] and Tata AIG General Insurance Company Ltd v. Shakuntala Devi & Ors.,[118] the Court held that the minimum wages as notified by the Govt. of NCT Of Delhi can be taken as the basis for computation of compensation inasmuch as even though the issue as to the validity of the notification of minimum wage is pending adjudication before the Supreme Court, no stay prevails on the operation of the said notification..In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Hina & Ors.,[119] the Court noted that the mere smell of alcohol emanating from the mouth of the deceased cannot lead to a presumption as to the drunkenness of the driver in the absence of a test having been conducted to determine whether the alcohol content in the body of the deceased was above the permissible limits..In National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Lokesh Verma & Ors.[120] and in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Khem Karan & Ors.,[121] the Court held that in a state of shock and disorientation following a serious accident, the apparent discrepancy in the statement of the injured person should be overlooked especially when the other evidence available on the record would substantiate the case..In Ali Asgar v. Om Prakash Rai & Ors. (Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. ),[122] the Court rejected the doubts sought to be cast on the actual place of residence of the injured by observing that people working in an unorganized sector of the economy may not always be able to offer formal proof of residence inasmuch as they may be residing with acquaintances or relatives..The Court while considering whether a ‘reach stacker’ would fall within the definition of a motor vehicle under Section 2 (28), in Rishi Ranjan Mishra v. Shubh Chander Yadav & Ors. (New India Assurance Co. Ltd),[123] answered in the affirmative inasmuch as it was found that the said contraption was mechanically propelled, had a chassis and was mounted on 4 wheels and adapted for use upon roads with the requisite engine capacity..In New India Assurance v. Sharda & Ors,[124] the Court agreed with the submission of the insurer that the right towards the recovery of compensation which it had been made liable to pay was not contingent upon a prior notice having been served to the driver of the vehicle from whom recovery was sought. The Court noted that inasmuch as the contract of insurance contemplates privity only between the insurer and the insured, there was no requirement for a separate notice to the driver..While considering the earning capacity for the purpose of determining compensation for a deceased student of the MCA Course, in Ram Vishal Gupta & Ors. v. Shokeen & Ors. (Cholamandlam Gen Ins Co. Ltd.),[125] it was observed that despite the improbabilities of life, the Court could assume that the deceased person would have completed the course and earned remuneration accordingly in the future. In order to determine the extent of compensation, factors such as the academic record, the identity of the institute and the likely employment or earning prospects in the field of study would be relevant factors..In Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dinesh & Ors.[126] while rejecting the deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased who was a homemaker and who was also engaged in knitting and stitching work, the Court noted that with the deceased being essentially a homemaker and with her family members not being dependent upon her earnings, it would be natural to presume that whatever she had earned would have remained with her as a private fund to be used only in the case of an exigency or a special occasion within the family..In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Saminuddin & Ors.,[127] the Court observed that the statutory requirement of possessing a driving license could not be met by merely procuring a certificate from a training school..In Shobha & Ors, v. Satish Kumar & Ors. (Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd.),[128] the Court observed that in terms of Section 166 of the MV Act, it was incumbent upon a party claiming there-under to establish that the injury or fatality complained of was caused as a result of rash and negligent driving of the vehicle in question..Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Mr. Amol Acharya and Mr. Bharat Rayadurgam, Advocates and Ms. Ramsha Mubin, Law Intern..[1] Judgment dated 18.09.2019 in C.R.P. 233/2018.[2] Judgment dated16.09.2019 in O.M.P. (EFA) (COMM.) 4/2018.[3] Judgment dated 30.9.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 390/2018.[4] Judgment dated 16.09.2019 in O.M.P. 601/2012.[5] Judgment dated 24.09.2019 in ARB. P. 416/2019.[6] Judgment dated 12.09.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 244/2019.[7] Judgment dated 12.09.2019 in O.M.P. 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