Legal Notes by Arvind Datar: Ejusdem Generis as applicable to the Constitution

The rule of ejusdem generis is frequently invoked to understand the scope of general words that follow special words in a statute. The Constitution of India also contains several articles that refer to a certain class of persons or entities and have general words that follow. This article highlights a few cases which have applied this rule to different articles of the Constitution. 

Article 12 of the Constitution defines the word “State” and includes the expression “or other authorities”.  The scope of this expression came up for consideration and it was held that the rule of ejusdem generis would not apply as there was no common genus running through various entities mentioned in Article 12. [Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857]. It was also held that this rule is inapplicable because Article 12 refers to several bodies which are heterogeneous in nature and there is no genus. [Housing Board of Haryana v. Haryana Housing Board & Employee’s Union (1996) 1 SCC 95].

The Calcutta High Court held that the principle of ejusdem generis will not apply to Article 31A(2)(b). This sub-clause defines the expression “rights” and uses the general expression “or other intermediary”. It was held that the categories of rights mentioned in sub-clause (b) refer to those of a proprietor, tenure holder, raiyat and so on. These rights do not belong to a common genus as the rights of a proprietor are completely different from that of a tenure-holder. [Ananta Kumar Dutta v. Land Revenue Officer, AIR 1958 Cal 143]

Article 298 states that the executive powers of the Union and the State also includes the power to carry on trade or business. The article uses the expression “the making of contracts for any purpose”. The Telangana High Court pointed out that this article refers to trade and business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property. Once again, there is no common thread or genus in Article 298 and, therefore, the general expression cannot be interpreted on the principle of ejusdem generis. [Konadakandla Yadaiah v. State of Telangana, 2017 (2) ALT 161]

Article 23 prohibits trafficking human beings and begar. It also uses the expression “other similar forms of forced labour”. It was held that the principle of ejusdem generis would not apply and is restricted to the two categories mentioned earlier. The expression “forced labour” has to be interpreted liberally and would include not only physical or legal force but also compulsions arising out of the economic circumstances, which will leave the person no choice or alternative but to provide labour or service.  A degree of involuntariness and compulsion will be inherent in the concept of forced labour under Article 23. [Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar, AIR 1988 Pat. 26]

Article 46 requires the State to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, particularly those belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was held that the words “weaker sections” in Article 46 cannot be restricted only to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or interpreted on the principle of ejusdem generis. This expression refers to all weaker sections and not just those belonging to the  SC/ST or backward classes. A narrow meaning cannot be given to the expression “weaker sections” as it will expose those who do not belong to the enumerated categories to exploitation. [Chairman, Adhoc Committee, Calcutta District Primary School Council v. Alpana Devi, 2003 SCC OnLine Cal 443].  

While Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights in Part-III, Article 226 enables writs to be issued in the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part-III and “for any other purpose”. In State of Orissa v Madan Gopal Rungta AIR 1952 SC 12, the Supreme Court held that the power of the High Court under Article 226 is founded only when a right of the aggrieved party under Part-III has been infringed. It can issue writs or directions “for any other purpose” but these concluding words of Article 226 must be read in the context of what precedes the same. It is submitted that this decision is incorrect as it  unduly restricts the powers of  the High Courts under Article 226. Fortunately, in several later judgments, the Supreme Court has rightly held that their jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised even where the issue of violation of fundamental rights has not arisen. A simple case like quashing an order for violation of principles of natural justice or issuing a writ of mandamus to a public authority to perform its statutory duty are all cases where no fundamental right may have been infringed. It is submitted that the expression “and for any other purpose” cannot be interpreted to restrict the power of the High Court to grant relief to the aggrieved citizens or persons; it should be construed literally -and enable the court to do justice subject, of course , to settled self-imposed limitations.

Arvind P Datar is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court.

The author acknowledges the assistance of Anirudh Ramanathan for his research on the subject.