Bombay High Court Judgment Tracker: July 2023

While sources concerning specific subject matters exist, there exist few sources that allow practitioners to be aware of developments with respect to specific forums. The Bombay High Court Judgment Tracker intends to fill this gap by providing a monthly gist of all decisions of the Bombay Bench of the Bombay High Court.

Since the purpose of the column is to provide a brief snapshot of all decisions to practitioners, the authors have avoided undertaking an analytical critique of the decisions.

Here is a summary of all decisions of the Bombay Bench of the Bombay High Court for the month of July 2023.

In Aditya Birla Finance Ltd v/s MVR Gas and ors, the court placed reliance on the recent decision of the Supreme Court in N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd which ruled that an unstamped instrument without the required stamp duty is not legally enforceable. Further, if such an instrument with an arbitration clause is presented in a Section 11 petition under the Arbitration Act, the Court must seize the instrument. The Court also held that under Sections 2(h) and 2(g) of the Contract Act and Sections 33 and 35 of the Stamp Act, an unstamped agreement lacks legal enforceability and cannot be used as evidence in Court or before a public authority. Unless properly stamped as per the Stamp Act, an agreement is deemed to be void and legally non-existent.

In Sheil Properties Pvt. Ltd. v/s Dani Wooltex Corporation &Ors, the Court held that an arbitrator cannot infer abandonment of proceedings by a party if they do not remain present in a reference to a related arbitration proceeding.

In Kotak Mahindra Bank v/s Williamson Magor and Co. Ltd, the Court held that if an arbitration agreement does not oust the jurisdiction of a tribunal which is formed under a special statute dealing with the dispute at hand, the said dispute will not fall under the the jurisdiction of the said tribunal, but will be arbitrable as per the arbitration agreement.

In The Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise v/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., with regard to Section 11D of the Central Excises Act, the Court observed that only where an amount is collected representing an excise duty, the amount is to be credited to the government. Otherwise, the Section would not be attracted. Further, with respect to the facts of the present case, the Court held that since the respondent was a public sector undertaking, the tests conducted in well-equipped laboratories in the absence of government laboratory facilities can be accepted by the department for classification purposes under the Tariff Act.

In M/s Vinod Metal v/s The State of Maharashtra, the Court held that an amount deposited under Section 73 (5) of the CGST Act 2017 is a voluntary deposit and that such a deposit must be accounted for in case of an liability to pay tax. In this case, the Court held that such a deposit cannot be excluded from consideration for the purpose of compliance of pre-deposit as mandated by Section 107 (6) of the CGST Act.

In Shalen D’Mello v/s Ruby Victoria Ferreira, the Court has enunciated in clear and explicit terms that if the explanation by the party is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the party seeking condonation of delay. The Court has reiterated that the object of the law of limitation is not to destroy the rights of the parties.

In Jitendra B. Mehta v/s Mansukhlal V Senghani, the Court held that Order XIV Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (“CPC”) clearly provides that issues have to be framed on the basis of material propositions of fact and law which is affirmed by one party and denied by the other, where not every fact in the plaint denied becomes an issue to be framed. The Court further ruled that the stage of framing the issues is an important one since the real dispute between the parties is determined and the area of conflict is narrowed. The correct decision of civil litigation largely depends on the correct framing of issues, and correctly determining the real points in controversy which need to be decided. The scheme of Order XIV of the CPC dealing with settlement of issues shows that an issue arises when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by another. The issues are to be framed and recorded on which the decision of the case shall depend. The Court is to exert itself so as to frame sufficiently expressive issues.

In Ajay Rajaram Hingev v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the proper course for the appellant would be to place their successive bail application before the same Judge who had decided the application earlier, particularly when the same Judge is  available and is sitting at the bench. The Court made the observation while citing the cases of Digambar Manohar Satam Vs. State of Maharashtra and Shahzad Hasan Khan Vs. Ishitaq Hasan Khan & Anr. The Court also found that there was no material change in circumstances surrounding the earlier order rejecting the bail application of the appellant and stated that the standing order dated February 29, 2008 was still in force and that the said procedure would have to be followed.

In Aslam Salim Shaikh v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court held that the petitioner should be be released on the basis of the period of imprisonment or sentence that he had already undergone while he was an undertrial prisoner in 41 cases against him. The order was passed invoking Section 482 of the CrPC and on the ground that there was a high probability of serious miscarriage of justice happening to the petitioner since he was convicted without considering that he was less than 21 years of age during commission of certain offences and did not have any legal representation during the trial. The High Court opined that due consideration was not given to these aspects since the petitioner filed the petition from jail. The High Court also noted that the petitioner was the sole earner for his family. The Court added that if the petitioner were to undergo imprisonment in all the 41 cases, he would be compelled to undergo imprisonment for approximately 83 years 3 months and 5 days. If he is unable to pay the fine, he would have to undergo jail time for a period of 93 years, the Court added, which it opined would amount to a travesty of justice that cannot be allowed to happen.

In Narayan Power Solutions v/s Union of India, the Court held that the “power to search” under Section 105 of the Customs Act does not amount to the “power to seal” since the power to seal is a drastic power which cannot be exercised unless the same is expressly conferred by law. The Court held that the customs authorities do not have an explicit power under the Section to seal the premises as the same would adversely affect the legal right of an individual to hold, use and occupy immovable property as guaranteed by Article 300 A of the Constitution. Additionally, if the premises sealed are business premises, the same would adversely affect the right to carry on business which is a fundamental right as under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In light of the above reasoning, the Court ultimately held that the powers vested under Section 105 are confined to “search” and that the legislature has not included “the power to seal” within the purview of this Section.

In Commissioner of customs v/s Air India Ltd, the Court, while reiterating the ratio laid down in the case of Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Finesse Creation Inc and other cases, held that if the goods are not available for confiscation, there cannot be any redemption fine under Section 125 of the Customs Act.

In Niloufer Soli Lam , v/s Zarir Pesi Bharucha, the Court held that matters that may fall under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act 1984 have been ousted from the jurisdiction of the civil courts after the establishment of family courts.

In Coventry Estates Pvt. Ltd. v/s The Joint Commissioner CGST and Central Excise, the Court held that there has to be a holistic approach and reading of the provisions of Section 73 of the Finance Act when it concerns the obligation and repository of the power to be exercised by the concerned officer to recover service tax while adjudicating any show cause notice issued against an assessee. It is crucial for the officer handling the show cause notice to rigorously follow the Act's stipulated timelines, as there is a definite purpose and intention of the legislature to prescribe such time limits, either under Section 73(4B) or under Section 73(1). The Court further held that an excessive delay in addressing a show cause notice is detrimental to the assessee and that the law seeks to eliminate such uncertainties. Keeping a notice pending for an extended period is not ideal. The delay not only hampers the legal rights of the assessee but can also negatively impacts the revenue's interests. Prompt adjudication is essential as prolonged delays can lead to irreversible changes, frustrating the entire adjudication process. The Court also opined that a substantial delay and inaction on the part of the department to adjudicate the show cause notice would seriously nullify the noticee’s rights, causing irreparable harm and prejudice to the notice. A delay in the adjudication of show cause notice would amount to denying fairness, judiciousness, non-arbitrariness and fulfilment of an expectation of meaningfully applying the principles of natural justice. The Court also provided that arbitrary and capricious administrative behaviour in the adjudication of show cause notice would be an antithesis to the norms of a lawful, fair and effective quasi-judicial adjudication.

In Madhani Prakash Engineers J V v/s Union of India and ors, the Court placed reliance on Sitaldas K. Motwani Vs. Director General of Income Tax (International Taxation) & Ors to note that the Court must construe “genuine hardship” liberally when the legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay to enable authorities to do substantive justice to the parties. The Court further noted that the authorities are expected to bear in mind that ordinarily applicants applying for condonation of delay do not stand to benefit by lodging their claim late. Hence, refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being disposed of and the cause of justice being defeated, the Court said.

In The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v/s Punit Chettiar, the Court noted that Section 80IA(4)(iii) of the Income Tax Act provides for the deduction of profit derived by the assessee from the development or operation of an industrial Part notified by the Central government. Further, the Industrial Park Scheme, 2002 lays down the criteria of eligibility, procedure of approval, conditions to be specified by the developer and once the concerned Ministry grants approval, it is incumbent on the part of the Assessing Officer to grant the deduction according to the provisions contained in Section 80IA where the deduction must be computed if the eligible business is the only source of income for the assessee.

In Sofitel Realty LLP and ors v/s Income Tax Officer and ors, the Court held that a compounding application cannot be rejected on the ground of delay in filing the application. Further, there is no restriction on the number of applications that can be filed. The only requirement mentioned under Section 279 (2) of the Income Tax Act is that the complaint filed should still be pending. The Court emphasized that the Section provides that any offense under Chapter XXII of the Act may be compounded by the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax or Commissioner of Income Tax or Principal Director General of Income Tax or Director General and no limitation is provided for the submission and consideration of the compounding application. However, the Income Tax officer has no power to even state the application to be null and void. The Court further held that the CBDT guidelines which were relied upon by the Income Tax officer cannot provide for any limitation or restrict the operation of Section 279(2) of the Act since the guideline is subordinate to the Principal Act and cannot override the specific provision enacted by the legislature.

In Rajshree Realtors Private Limited v/s Union of India and ors, the Court noted that Section 147 of the Act is very clear that no action shall be taken under the said Section after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment years, unless any income chargeable tax has escaped assessment by reason of the failure on the part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

In Cummins India Limited v/s Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, the Court placed reliance on the apex court’s judgment, Radhasoami Satsang Vs. CIT to hold that in the absence of change in material facts, the department is bound by the previous decision. The Court further held that when the Tribunal previously determined that the royalty payment for technology use is fundamentally tied to the manufacturing activity and must be combined with other international transactions in the manufacturing sector for benchmarking, and the TPO agrees to this aggregation without raising concerns about the royalty payment under the same agreement, the Tribunal should have adhered to the decision made by the corresponding bench under identical factual circumstances.

In Latif Yusuf Manikkoth v/s The Board of Directors of the Bank of Baroda, the Court's decision was influenced by a precedent set by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan & Anr. The above precedent asserted that Sections 14 and 31 of the IBC (Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code) do not obstruct the commencement or progression of SARFAESI proceedings against a guarantor. Further the Court has reiterated that as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Ors. Vs. Matthew K.C, if statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the SARFAESI Act are available, the High Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders as such would be nothing but an abuse of process of the Court.

In Bombay Dyeing & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v/s Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, the Court held that pursuant to Section 88(a)(i) of the Act, the disputed income of the taxpayer is determined based on the tax arrears or contested tax. To avail the advantages of KVSS, entities like companies or firms must remit taxes at a rate of thirty-five per cent of the calculated disputed income. Secondly, based on the given definitions for disputed tax and disputed income, to determine the disputed tax, one must first calculate the total assessed tax for that specific year. Then, any taxes the assessee might have already paid should be subtracted from this amount. As outlined in Section 88(f), the disputed tax refers to the total tax determined as payable but not yet paid as of the declaration date. To determine the remaining unpaid tax, it is essential to consider any refunds the Revenue authorities might have provided to the assessee, as well as any related interest. If these factors are not taken into account, the resulting figure would not accurately represent the true unpaid tax.

In Vallipuram G. Venkiteswaran v/s ITO, Mumbai, the Court held that a ruling will be binding only as against the applicant and the revenue in relation to the transaction for which it so sought, relying on Section 245S of the Income Tax Act 1961. The Court further held that merely because the AAR in the case of another applicant has taken a different view, it cannot be sufficient reason to assume that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment.

In Keshav Harishchandra Bhoir v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors, the Court allowed the writ petition and held that there was a malafide attempt on the part of the respondent/complainant to entangle the petitioner in a false offence citing the case of  Vineet Kumar And Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Another and State of Haryana and Others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, since the respondent was unable to explain the delay of more than 20 years in preferring the criminal complaint and since the allegation that the registered sale deed signed by the petitioner's deceased father was a forgery could not be classified as one since the essential ingredients for forgery were not satisfied in view of the orders passed in civil proceedings and the opinion of a handwriting expert.

In Sangita Vilas Kiwade v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune, in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, since  evidence on record clearly showed that the appellant, by luring the four minor children to eat ice cream, removed them from the lawful custody of the complainant without her consent and took them to the canal with the intention of committing the crime, fulfilling the conditions for the offence under Section 363 of the IPC, which was affirmed by the three child witnesses and further corroborated by a fourth eye witness, thus fulfilling the conditions set by Pradeep Vs. The State of Maharashtra for admissibility of evidence by minor witnesses. The Court also rejected the contentions that the appellant had not taken the children with the intention to commit the crime and that it was an unfortunate incident, since the prosecution had proven the commission of crime beyond reasonable doubt.

In Ashik Ramjaii Ansari v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court set aside the judgment by a Special POCSO Judge convicting the accused of rape under Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 376 of the IPC. The trial court had convicted the accused on the ground that though the sexual intercourse was consensual, the girl was minor. However, the High Court overturned the trial court conviction since the act was consensual, opining the appellant cannot suffer the sentence in case of a consensual sexual act. The Court explained that though the girl did not attain the age of maturity (18 years), it could be specifically inferred from her conduct that she was capable of understanding the consequences of her act. Hence, the Court directed that the appellant be released unless some other charges were levied against him.

In Zulfikar Abdul Rashid Khan v/s Union of India, the Court noted that in a matter where the litigant adopts a remedy which is not the appropriate remedy in a bonafide manner and in good faith, Section 14 of the limitation Act must be applied to ensure that the litigant is not kept away from the appropriate forum on the ground that the proceedings are time barred. The Court further noted that the proceedings must be held to be maintainable and that the delay in filing the appeal must be condoned by invoking this Section.

In State of Maharashtra and ors v/s Vitthal Tulshiram Jadhav, the Court noted that in view of Rule 33 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension Rules), 1982 concerning a government servant holding a permanent post at the time of his retirement, his entire temporary or officiating service rendered without any interruption is required to be counted towards pension. The Court further ruled that a situation where the interruption in service was caused by reason beyond control of the individual and the period of interruption does not exceed five years, the interruption in service deserved to be condoned and is covered under Rule 48 of the pension rules.

In Chief Executive Officer, Vita Nagar Parishad, Vita v/s Tanaji Ramchandra Kadam, the Court held that if a case is covered by any of the exceptions incorporated in Rule 57 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension) Rules, the concerned government servant would not be entitled to pension notwithstanding having rendered the qualifying service recognized under Rule 30. To determine whether the service rendered by the government servant qualifies for permanent service, the test is not whether the government servant is first appointed in permanent or temporary capacity but whether at the time of retirement he holds a permanent post substantively. If at the time of retirement, a government servant holds a permanent post substantively, to which he might have been made permanent at a later point of time, the past service rendered by the government servant on a temporary post also qualifies for the pensionable service. Thus, under Rule 30, the determinant is not the nature of the initial appointment but the nature of the post held by the government servant at the time of retirement. The Court also held that if a case is clearly covered by the prescription in the pension rules, there can be no waiver of the right to receive pension.

In Priti Rakesh Patil v/s The State of Maharashtra, the Court determined that the management was negligent in not fulfilling its obligations under the Act and the associated rules, as well as the various Government Resolutions issued by the Education Department from time to time.

In Akash Dipak Atole and ors v/s The State of Maharashtra and ors, the Court held that if the Education Department fails to respond promptly or to conform to the provisions of the Act and various GRs, neither the Management nor the employee can be allowed to suffer. It is necessary that the Department reconfigures its internal functioning to act in aid of the provisions of law. It must also reconfigure the various GRs issued from time to time to bring about the desired result and to ensure that all stakeholders in the appointment mechanism work in tandem with each other, the Court said.

In Rajan Sahadeo Ratul v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court quashed the rejection letter sent to the petitioner by the respondent under the MEPS Act and held that the management is well within its rights to commence the selection process in the absence of any response from the Education Officer regarding vacant seats of "Shikshan Sevak" in schools.

In Garodia Co-operative Housing Society Ltd v/s District Deputy Registrar Co-operative society, the Court held that the competent authority under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the promotion of Construction, Sale Management and Transfer) Act, 1963, has to apply its mind to several aspects when deciding an application for deemed conveyance, including the applicant’s eligibility and whether or not the promoter/developer has duly discharged its obligations in terms of Section 11 of the Act.

In Shineshilpi Jewellers (P) Ltd. v/s Vimal Prakash Jain of Police & Ors, the Court found that the magistrate had simply considered absence of complainant only on two dates and dismissed the complaint, which was wrong. The High Court disposed of the appeal while stating that the respondent was justified in opposing the appeal on the basis of facts and circumstances, while compensating the first respondent with costs.

In Santosh Namdeo Koli v/s Bhanudas Yesu Gadade, the Court placed reliance on Gulabrao Bhaurao Kakade, since deceased by L.R.s and Others vs. Nivrutti Krishan Bhilare and Ors and held that no specific period of limitation is stipulated under Section 32 of the Act. However, it has been repeatedly held by various judicial pronouncements that ordinarily a period of three years is required to be taken as a reasonable period, within which proceedings are required to be adopted for correction in the Consolidation Scheme, the Court ruled.

In Nana Narayan Bhalerao v/s District Resettlement Officer, the Court held that the petition was barred by the principles of delay and laches. The Court noted that if an individual does not assert their legal rights for an extended period, as in this case, it is inferred they have abandoned those rights. Such rights become nullified by the person's own inaction, and reviving them would be like reviving a dead claim. This is against public policy, especially when it concerns government lands and the Act does not support such claims upon close examination, the Court opined.

In Dnyanu Bhiku Tanpure thru LR Suresh Dnyanu Tanpure v/s The Deputy Collector, Rehabilitation, Pune & Ors., the Court dismissed a petition for the allotment of alternate land and for the issuance of a notice under Section 16(2)(a) of the Maharashtra Project Affected Persons Rehabilitation Act, 1999, stating that the there was a delay of more than 33 years between the acquisition, making it  barred by limitation. It also held that the acquisition was covered under the previous Act, namely the Maharashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act 1976, which did not have the provision of Section 16 or any similar provision which was made with a retrospective effect.

In Vijay Babarao Shende v/s Maharashtra Public Service Commission, the Court placed reliance on the Supreme court judgment in Union of India v. Ramesh Ram to reiterate that reserved category candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes or Other Backward Classes categories who are selected on merit and placed in the list of general category candidates, can choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the time of allocation of service. The Court cited the above judgment to also clarify that the process of selection and the appointment are two different stages and not to be confused. For the purpose of selection, candidates from the reserved category, if found eligible, can compete for one or two posts. In the process of selection one candidate can claim and compete for more than one post, however, he/she can be selected only for one post.

In Subhash Gulabchand Pawar v/s Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, the Court noted that in cases of indictment of misappropriation by a conductor of a State Transport Bus, it has been consistently held that the non-examination of the passengers is not a ground to throw the charge of misconduct overboard. The Court further noted that once misappropriation is established, the punishment of dismissal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate, although, regard should be had to be circumstances of the given case, including the past conduct of the delinquent.

In Yashwant Govind Sakhare v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court held that if no steps are taken by the party within 24 months from the date of service of notice under Section 127 of the Act of 1966 for the acquisition of land, the reservation lapses. Further, the Court noted that if the land is reserved, allotted or designated for any purpose in any development plan and is not acquired by agreement within ten years from the date when the final regional plan or final development plan takes effect or if a declaration under Section 126 (2) or (4) is not published in the Official Gazette within ten years, then Section 127 of the Act, 1966 operates and the reservation lapses. Hence, the owner or any person interested in land can serve notice on the planning authority, the development authority or the appropriate authority, and if the land is not acquired or no steps are started for its acquisition within 24 months from the date of service of such notice, the reservation will be considered to have lapsed.

In Mr. Prashant S. Sawant v/s Thane Municipal Corporation, the Court held that, it is a settled position in law that minority members cannot go against majority members’ will and stop redevelopment. They cannot make other members who have already vacated suffer. They cannot cause delays to other members in completing redevelopment work, resulting in project costs increasing every day. Such an approach harms the majority of members. The Court further held that it is also a settled position in law that once a person becomes a member of society, he loses his individuality and has no independent rights except those given by the statutes and by-laws.

In Golden Legend Leasing and Finance Ltd & Anrv/s Mr. Dilip Manohar Amladi & Ors, the Court held that exemption under Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act 1999 will not apply to private and limited companies which have a paid up share capital amount exceeding one crore rupees. Explaining further, the Court held that an application by a landlord for damages and eviction is not maintainable against a company whose paid up share capital exceeds one crore rupees.

In Tatoba Rama Chavan v/s Collector, Kolhapur District, Kolhapur, the Court held that when a petitioner sleeps over his/her rights for almost three decades and when petition is filed after gross delay and laches, she/he cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, more so, when there is no averment in the petition explaining the delay.

In Dnyanu Bhiku Tanpure v/s Shankar Abaji Kshirsagar, the Court held the petition to be hopelessly barred by delays and laches and that such a gross and inordinate delay of more than 33 years in filing the present proceedings of both petitions was a total abuse of the process of law.

In Oasis Realty v/s Commissioner of Sales Tax and ors, the Court with respect to the scheme of composition notified under Section 42(3A) of the MVAT Act, held that the object and purpose of the composition scheme is to provide a simple and hassle free method of assessment where the contractor saves himself the burden of bookkeeping, assessment etc. Further, the Court, in regard to condition 3 under the Section, which makes dealers opting for the said composition scheme ineligible for claiming set-offs of taxes in respect of purchases, held that no exception can be made to certain kinds of purchases as the object of the scheme would be defeated if the Assessing Officer has to make an enquiry as to what goods have been transferred and in respect of what purchases, set off can be claimed.

In Pune Municipal Corporation v/s Surmilan Singh Soibam, the Court placed reliance on the Supreme Court judgment Nagappa vs. Gurdial Singh and Ors and held that the function of the Tribunal / Court is to award just compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record, even though the same may not be claimed or appealed for. The Court added that there is no restriction which required that compensation should only be awarded up to the amount claimed by the claimants. The Court noted that that the claimants are legally and legitimately entitled to the said claims and it is the statutory duty of the Tribunal and the Appellate Court to award just and reasonable compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased to mitigate their hardship and agony.

In Balaji Constructions v/s Dattatraya Bapurao Ghadage, the Court found no fault in the findings recorded by the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the respondent had correctly taken and proved the defence under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act correctly, citing the case of K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Anr. and Pankaj Mehra and Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others to support the facts and circumstances of the case by applying the principles laid down in the judgments.

In Shrikisan Narayanrao Solanki v/s The State of Maharashtra, the Court held that not only Primary Teachers but also Assistant Teachers can be appointed on transfer in the District Technical Services (Class-III) (Educational) of the Recruitment Rules, 2016. The court further noted that since the Primary Teachers in Zilla Parishad Schools were held by the Tribunal as eligible to participate in the LDCE 2017, there is no reason why Assistant Teachers in Zilla Parishad Primary Schools cannot be held eligible.

In Siddharth Pitbas Nayak v/s Union of India, the Court held that sealed cover procedure can be adopted only when charge memo/sheet is actually issued by the disciplinary authority and not on grounds of pendency of vigilance enquiry or proposed initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The date of actual service of charge sheet is irrelevant and the date on which charge sheet is dispatched for service is the relevant date for adoption of sealed cover procedure, the Court added.

In ESS Infraproject Pvt. Ltd and ors v/s Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and ors, the Court said that, in absence of legal provisions mentioned by the petitioner, once a building is declared as a C1 Category building, then the entire building has to be demolished. The Court refrained from deciding whether a partial demolition of a building is permitted in law or not. The Court further held that the rights of the members of the housing society would be governed through the society. Therefore, the minority members will not have a right to hold up a redevelopment project when the majority have agreed for the same and vacated the premises, the Court added.

In Pranav Sadashiv Lad v/s Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee, Kolhapur, the Court held that the petitioner cannot be allowed in law to claim at one point that he has one social status, which is validated by the Scrutiny Committee also later, and then claim that he has a different social status. If this is permitted, it will lead to uncertainty with regard to social status claimed by various persons and introduce an element of chaos in the policy of affirmative action initiated by the State. Further, it would also lead to committing malpractices by some persons in order to illegally corner the benefits flowing from reservation policies, which would ultimately adversely affect the public policy. When the social status claimed by a person at one point of time is accepted and certified to be valid by a competent authority, there is no way that such person is allowed again to change his claim as regards his social status to become one of the beneficiaries of the policy of the affirmative action of the State. Sanctity as well as finality has to be attached to the claims of social status made by the persons, as a matter of public policy, the Court said.

In Indus Towers Ltd., Pune v/s Grampanchayat, Chikhalhol, Tal. Khanapur, the Court held that it is well settled law that any agency or institution or person which seeks to deny a benefit or right to another on a special ground, such as the ground of mobile tower radiation being harmful to the health of the citizens, such agency or institution or person has a special burden of proof to establish the soundness of such a ground.

In Shailesh K Bothra v/s State of Maharashtra, the Court held that after the assessee has been recognised as a secured creditor and his first charge has been recognised, the charge of the Sales Tax Department to recover sales tax dues would be valid and legal.

In Deepak Bobhale v/s The Assistant Divisional Engineer, the Court held that a party cannot take a chance to capitalize on the old nature of an acquisition which is about 60 years. The Court further noted that the said plea was within the realm of disputed questions of facts, which cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction after such a long period of time.

In Chandan Shantaram Gunjal v/s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd, the Court held that the purpose of needing a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from a PSU/Government department is to confirm that the government or PSU has no reservations about an employee joining a new organization. Although past employers might not usually object, there can be situations where, due to reasons like staff shortage, existing service bonds, or training expenses, a government or PSU might be hesitant to release an employee. This overarching reason is why a NOC from a prior employer is often mandated. It prevents an employee from leaving their current government or PSU role without due consideration.