Blurring secular boundaries: The perils of religious endorsements in constitutional courts

The recent decision of the Karnataka High Court in a matrimonial case, in which a Division Bench of Justices Krishna S Dixit and Vijaykumar A Patil suggested that the estranged couple seek blessings and guidance from His Holiness Shri Abhinava Gavisiddeshwara Swamiji, raises profound questions regarding judicial neutrality and the constitutional principle of secularism.

The constitutional boundaries of secularism

India's constitutional framework explicitly embraces secularism as a cornerstone of its democratic order. The Preamble declares India to be a “secular” republic, and Articles 14, 15, and 21 reinforce the principles of equality and non-discrimination, including on the grounds of religion. Furthermore, Articles 25 to 28 guarantee freedom of religion while simultaneously placing restrictions on state endorsement or promotion of religious practices. In SR Bommai v. Union of India, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution, and any action by the State, including the judiciary, that violates this principle would be invalid.

As an organ of the State, the judiciary is constitutionally obliged to function without bias or deference to any religious body or figure. The judiciary must, therefore, exercise its functions in a manner that is devoid of religious bias or endorsement. In matrimonial disputes, where courts are tasked with applying personal laws, the judiciary must remain vigilant to ensure that the adjudication of rights is in accordance with constitutional mandates and that religion is not improperly interwoven into the judicial process.

Judicial neutrality and involvement of religious bodies in adjudication

In the present case, the Karnataka High Court’s suggestion that the estranged couple seek blessings from a religious figure raises concerns regarding the breach of the judiciary's duty to remain neutral and secular. Matrimonial disputes, such as those governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, involve the interpretation of legal rights and duties, albeit based on personal laws that may have religious foundations. However, the judiciary's function is to apply these laws within the framework of constitutional values, not to intertwine religious practices with judicial orders.

The direction to seek the blessings and guidance of a religious leader introduces an element of religiosity into a matter that is inherently legal in nature. This raises the question of whether the Court has overstepped its constitutional boundaries by endorsing a particular religious authority in the resolution of a dispute between parties. The Supreme Court has previously warned against excessive entanglement between religion and the State in cases like Aruna Roy v. Union of India, where it reiterated that secularism implies that the State will neither promote nor interfere with any religion.

In its order, the High Court not only suggested, but went so far as to "pray his Holiness Shri Abhinava Gavisiddeshwara Swamiji to bless the couple and advise the parties as to what should follow their marital difference/dispute." This request, though framed in a manner of deference, raises troubling issues regarding the separation of judicial and religious authority.

First, it is critical to underscore that judges, while occupying the constitutional seat, are not vested with the authority to invoke religious figures as part of the judicial process. This act of the Court amounts to an abdication of its secular mandate, delegating what is essentially a judicial function to a religious figure. The Constitutional Oath of Office under Schedule III requires judges to uphold the Constitution and its principles, including secularism, without fear, favour, or prejudice. Inviting a religious leader to intervene not only departs from this oath, but also constitutes a form of judicial overreach, where the Court has aligned itself with a religious institution.

Precedential impact and the risk of judicial sectarianism

The High Court’s order also risks creating a troubling precedent. If religious authorities are seen as acceptable arbiters in judicial matters, future litigants may demand similar interventions based on their respective faiths. This could lead to a form of judicial sectarianism, where different religious figures are invoked for different parties based on their religious affiliations. Such a practice would erode the secular character of the Indian judiciary and lead to further religious entanglements in legal proceedings. By directing parties toward religious figures, the judiciary runs the risk of normalising the involvement of religious authorities in secular legal disputes. In a diverse and multi-religious society like India, where the Constitution ensures equal treatment of all religions and prohibits the State from favouring any one faith, the Court’s directive could be perceived as contrary to this principle.

Moreover, the judiciary’s implicit endorsement of a particular religious leader may marginalise individuals who do not subscribe to the same faith, potentially undermining the inclusive and pluralistic nature of the legal system. In a pluralistic society like India, where the Constitution guarantees equality before the law, the judiciary must be cautious to ensure that its actions do not convey favouritism toward any particular religion or religious institution. The potential for religious bias or preferential treatment, even if unintended, is anathema to the constitutional principle of secularism. By invoking religious figures, courts open the door to subjective and potentially sectarian considerations entering the legal process. The judiciary’s authority is derived from the Constitution, not from religious institutions. The secular character of the judiciary must remain inviolable to ensure equal treatment under law, irrespective of religious beliefs or affiliations.

The limits of judicial discretion in promoting reconciliation

It is important to recognise that courts often play an active role in promoting reconciliation in matrimonial disputes and often employ mediation, counselling, or other non-adversarial mechanisms to encourage reconciliation. The judiciary’s role in fostering reconciliation, however, must be exercised within the parameters of constitutional limits. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while courts may recommend alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such recommendations must be secular in nature. The apex court has time and again emphasized the importance of using trained mediators and counsellors in matrimonial disputes to assist parties in finding common ground. These professionals are equipped to handle delicate issues related to marriage and family life without introducing religious overtones, thus ensuring that the process remains neutral and in line with constitutional values. If reconciliation was the Court’s aim, it should have directed the couple toward professional counsellors or mediation centres governed by secular law. By involving a religious leader, the Court has blurred the distinction between personal faith and the secular authority of the State.

The Karnataka High Court’s suggestion and subsequent directive to involve a religious leader in resolving a matrimonial dispute constitutes a departure from its constitutional duty to maintain secularism in the administration of justice. By "praying" to a religious figure, the Court has overstepped its role as a neutral adjudicator, blurring the lines between judicial authority and religious influence.

While reconciliation in matrimonial matters is a worthy judicial goal, the means employed to achieve that end must remain within the constitutional framework. The judiciary must refrain from delegating its functions to religious figures and instead promote secular avenues of dispute resolution. Upholding the principle of secularism is not only a constitutional requirement but also essential to preserving the public’s trust in the judiciary as an impartial and neutral institution. The High Court’s well-intentioned but constitutionally problematic directive must be critically revaluated in light of these broader legal and ethical concerns.

Nisha Tiwari is an advocate practising before the Supreme Court of India.