With its vast and varied case-docket, the High Court of Delhi has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief over-view of the important pronouncements of the High Court of Delhi over the period of the relevant month in review.

While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.

Arbitration

While reiterating the justification for rejecting an application seeking permission for placing on record certain documents other than those placed before the arbitrator at the stage of proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (‘Arbitration Act’),the Court in Directorate General, Border Security Force v. NIIT Technologies Ltd.[1]held that an application under Section 34 can only be considered with regard to the pleadings and the evidence placed before the arbitrator.

The Court in National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation v. KMC Constructions Ltd.[2] observed that an order passed by an arbitrator refusing to summon a witness under Section 27 of the Arbitration Act would not be appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

In Employees State Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ravi Associates,[3] the Court reiterated that while hearing an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, it would be loath to interfere with the two concurring views upholding the arbitral award i.e., by the arbitrator and subsequently by the court hearing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, unless manifest perversity was demonstrated.

In Shriram Distribution Services Pvt. Ltd. v. A.N. Traders Pvt. Ltd.,[4] the Court held that when an agreement had been found to have expired by efflux of time on a particular date, and subsequent transactions by the parties were not undertaken under its aegis, then the arbitration clause contained in the said agreement could also not be said to govern disputes which arose in relation to the subsequent transactions.

In Unibros v. All India Radio,[5] the Court held that though the scope of interference with an arbitral award is narrow, an award which granted an entitlement to a party without there being any evidence of loss suffered would be liable to be set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In NHAI v. Patel-KNR,[6] the Court reiterated that the arbitrator was the final judge for the determination of delay in execution of work under a contract, and the aspect as to whether the delay was concurrent, or attributable only to one party, was a matter which fell eminently within the domain of the arbitrator.

In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Vindhya Telelinks Pvt. Ltd.,[7] the Court reiterated that an explanation premised merely on administrative delays and bureaucratic red-tape would not be a sufficient ground to condone the delay beyond the period of three months for filing a petition as prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act.

In Maruti Suzuki India Limited v. Moto Drive Private Limited,[8] the Court held that even an arbitration clause contained in an unsigned agreement can result in a binding agreement to arbitrate , in terms of Section 7(4)(b) of the Arbitration Act if it could be demonstrated through subsequent correspondence between the parties that the parties were in fact construing the said agreement and the arbitration clause contained therein as binding upon them and were also acting upon and under the same.

In Prime Market Reach Pvt. Ltd. v. Supreme Advertising Pvt. Ltd.,[9] the Court reiterated that a subsequent agreement between the parties which does not contain an arbitration clause, and which makes no reference to an earlier contract between the same parties and the arbitration clause contained therein, could not result in a reference to arbitration.

In Aravali Infra Power Limited v. Michigan Engineers Pvt. Ltd.,[10] the Court held that when the arbitrator had given a cogent reason for rejecting the report of expert witnesses placed before him, then the said reason could not be assailed within the limited scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In Ashoka Kraft Paper Mills LLP v. Raj Kumar Aggarwal,[11] the Court deprecated the tendency of disgruntled litigants casting aspersions on the independence of an arbitrator on flimsy grounds with the intention to force a recusal, and observed that applications seeking termination of mandate of the arbitrator on such unfounded allegations of bias are required to be summarily rejected.

While reiterating that mere mentioning of an incorrect provision in an application would not denude the power of the Court to consider the same in accordance with the correct provisions, the Court in M/S Bansal Constructions Company V. Sr. DEN IV Northern Railway,[12] held that when an application was incorrectly styled as one under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’) whereas it would be covered under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act inasmuch as the petition in question was filed with a delay of 27 days beyond the three month period as provided under Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration Act, then the application could not have been summarily rejected on the sole ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was otherwise inapplicable.

In M/S Value Advisory Services v. M/s ZTE Corporation,[13] the Court held that even in the case of arbitration agreements which were entered into prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services INC,[14]the fact that the designated seat of arbitration was outside India and the identified curial law was also foreign, would indicate that the parties had intended to exclude the provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act.

Banking and Finance

While construing the scope of the protection afforded to a judgment debtor by Section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’), as applicable to Delhi, the Court in Sujata Kapoor v. Union Bank of India,[15] held that the purpose of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 (‘PRI Act’) was not to grant relief from indebtedness of all kinds and of whatsoever nature to all debtors and it was surmised that the expression ‘judgment debtor’ used in Clause (ccc) of proviso to Section 60(1) of the CPC has to be read and understood in the context of the expression ‘debtor’ used in the PRI Act, lest it leads to wholly undeserving benefits being showered upon judgment debtors for whose benefit the said clause was never intended, and causes injustice to creditors against whom it was never intended to be used as a shield. The Court, therefore, refused to extend the said benefit of the said provision to the petitioner who was facing recovery proceedings under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2000 (‘SARFAESI Act’).

In Joint Director Directorate of Enforcement Lucknow v. Naresh Grover,[16] while upholding a right of a bank to enforce a mortgage under the SARFAESI Act though the said property had been attached by the Enforcement Directorate (‘ED’) in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2000 (‘PMLA’), the Court in the facts of the case observed that even if it had to be accepted as a proposition that assets which are not a result of criminal activity can be attached in lieu of assets which are so derived, the same can only be attached from the hands of the person who is guilty of committing the relevant scheduled crime or otherwise holds proceedings of the crime, and not otherwise.

In Larsen and Toubro Limited v. Experion Developers Pvt. Ltd.,[17] the Court reiterated the general principle that the question of grant of stay against the invocation of a bank guarantee has to be resolved independent of the terms of the main contract between the parties.

In G. Gehani v. Reserve Bank of India,[18] the Court held that a person who is sought to be labelled as a wilful defaulter pursuant to the order of a committee of the bank which had extended the loan is entitled to file a representation against the same before a review committee in terms of the Master Circular dated 01.07.2015 issued by the Reserve Bank of India in this regard. The Court further observed that the first committee is also required to furnish reasons in support of its order.

Civil Procedure

In Multan @ Sultan v. Shiv Prasad,[19] the Court held that, inasmuch as Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’) empowers a Court to render a judgment based on the admission made by a party at any stage of the suit, it could not be said that there was be a cut-off point in the course of the proceedings beyond which the said provision could not be invoked.

In Y N Gupta v. M/S M. A. Ramzana,[20] the Court reiterated that repeated adjourning of matters for the purpose of pronouncement of the order is unacceptable and the Court has an obligation to pronounce judgment within a reasonable time after the same have been reserved.

In TUSAJ Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd. v. SKB Food Products Pvt. Ltd.,[21] the Court reiterated that the observations made while disposing of an application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC would not bind the trial court at the stage of final disposal of the suit.

In ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Nidhi Sharma,[22] the Court observed that in the case of a loan transaction where there is a default, an application filed under Order XXXIX Rule 6 of the CPC by a financial institution seeking permission to sell the hypothecated vehicle in its custody should be expeditiously disposed of and sale should be carried out through a receiver appointed by the Court at the earliest in the light of the fact that the value of the vehicle would deteriorate over time and also involve a steep maintenance cost for the financial institution in question.

In Cargill India Pvt. Ltd. v. DeepayanMohanty,[23] the Court held that in a case where the plaintiff had filed a summary suit towards recovery of incentive payments due to him from the employer, a demonstration of the fact that the plaintiff was engaged in gainful association with a competitor during his course of employment would undoubtedly reflect a plausible defense entitling the defendant employer leave to defend.

In Ravita v. Suresh,[24] the Court reiterated that after a witness has been formally discharged, then the said witness could only be recalled for certain basic clarifications by the court itself, and fresh documents could not be sought to be put to the witness under the said guise. The Court further noted that with the repeal of Order XVIII Rule 17(A) of the CPC, the power to recall a witness was very limited.

In SarveshBisaria v. Anand NirogDham Hospital Pvt. Ltd., [25] the Court deprecated the total non-application of mind by the trial court in the issuance of templated summons pertaining to a regular suit to the defendant, when the suit had in fact been filed under Order XXXVII of the CPC which has its own requisite format i.e., Form No. 4 in Appendix-B.

In Roshan Lal v. Ram Nath Garg,[26] the Court held the mandate given to an advocate commissioner appointed by a court to examine the exact dimensions of the suit property when there was a controversy as to whether the said property stood amalgamated with an adjacent property or not, could not extend to giving an opinion as to the aspect of amalgamation of the property inasmuch as the said issue was required to be decided by the court alone on the basis of the commissioner’s report containing the relevant measurements, and the pleadings and evidence on record.

In Atul Kumar Singh v. Nitish Kumar,[27] the Court reiterated that a plaintiff could be permitted to summon a defendant in the suit as a witness on its behalf only in exceptional circumstances.

In Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd.v. Maharia Raj Joint Venture,[28] the Court issued a slew of directions and formulated a detailed format of the Affidavits to be filed by a judgment debtor in execution cases, after examining international best practices in this regard.

In Krishan Kumar Wadhwa v. Arjun SomDutt,[29] the Court observed that while exercising the power under Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC to permit belated filing of the documents by the plaintiff it must be demonstrated that the factual basis of the documents which were not available at the time of filing of the suit were suitably pleaded in the plaint. The Court further held that the mere fact that the documents were obtained after the filing of the suit is of little consequence inasmuch as it was for the plaintiff to have undertaken the necessary diligence to obtain the necessary documents at the stage of filing of the suit.

In Ajay Malik v. Prem Lata,[30] the Court held that when a plain reading of the plaint in a suit seeking joint ownership and relief of partition filed by a co-owner would demonstrate that the plaintiff has been ousted from possession of the suit property, then the plaintiff is required to pay ad-valorem court fees on his/her share of the property in question.

In Sarvinder Singh v. The Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank,[31] the Court reiterated that a suit against a mere ‘office’ such as the manager of a bank, which is not a legal entity in itself, would not be maintainable.

In Rajesh Anand v. Rahul Wadhwani,[32] the Court held that a litigant who had on the basis of certain statements put the criminal law into motion could not be heard to contend that the said statement could not be used against him/her in a separate civil proceeding inasmuch as this would amount to permitting disparate stands being taken before different forums.

In Satish Yadav v. Bhagwan Singh,[33] the Court reiterated that the general rule enshrined in the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC that amendments in pleadings ought not be permitted after commencement of the trial is not an inflexible one and can be deviated from in appropriate cases, particularly when due diligence by the plaintiff is evident and the omissions sought to be remedied can be shown to be an inadvertent error not requiring any new facts to the established.

In Hemant Kumar Singhal v. Kumar Singhal,[34] the Court held that even without reserving a right to lead rebuttal evidence, a plaintiff can be permitted to do so provided the onus of proof in relation to the issue in question was on the opposite side. However, where the issue framed is a general one where the onus is on both the plaintiff and the defendant, then no such opportunity could be claimed.

In Rakesh Kumar Nanda v. Jitender Singh,[35] the Court observed that the liability of a legal heir would not stretch beyond the sum of the value of the estate of the deceased in the said legal heir’s hands in terms of Section 50 of the CPC.

In Dinesh Dayal v. YogeshwarDayal,[36] the Court held that inasmuch as the provisions for transfer of cases is governed by Sections 22 & 24 of the CPC, an application under Section 151 of the CPC before the district court seeking transfer of the matter to the High Court would not be maintainable.

In Bimla Devi v. Mohd Shahzad,[37] the Court held that no appeal could be maintained by a person who was not a party in the original suit in which the compromise decree against which he/she was aggrieved was passed, more so when even the transaction which was the subject matter of the suit had no relation with the appellant. The Court held that the correct course of action was to file an independent suit challenging the decree, if the party was so aggrieved.

Rakesh Jain v. Arun Kumar,[38] the Court held that a municipal record and conduct of parties consistent with the same, would be given preference over contrary oral testimonies.

In Rohtash v. Satbir,[39] the Court held that the term ‘subject matter’ appearing in Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of the CPC includes both the cause of action as also the relief claimed, and relates to the relevant facts which justify a right to sue to obtain money, property or enforcement of a right.

Company Law and Insolvency

In Surinder Singh Marwah v. Aeren Entertainment Zone Pvt. Ltd.,[40] the Court reiterated that Sections 339 to 342 of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘Companies Act’), provide wide powers to the Court to set right the fraudulent wrongs that the company has committed when it was evident that the business of the company was carried out with an intent to defraud creditors or for any other fraudulent purpose, including issuing a declaration making the promoters personally responsible for any or all of the debts or other liabilities of the company in question.

In Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Union of India,^[41] the Court refused to entertain a writ petition against an order passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (‘NCLT’) in the absence of a demonstration that there was a palpable lack of jurisdiction or authority of the NCLT to decide the issue in question, and directed the petitioner to avail the statutory remedy of filing an appeal there-against under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘IBC’).

In Gaurav Kumar v. Serious Fraud Investigation Office,[42] the Court observed that the applicability of the punishment for false statement under section 448 of the Companies Act would be doubtful where there was no specific document signed by the person alleged to have made the said statement, and only draft un-signed statements were available.

In Securities & Exchange Board of India v. CRB Capital Markets Ltd.,[43] while construing the purport of Section 542 of the Companies Act, 1956 (‘1956 Act’), the Court held that the standard of proof to prove fraudulent conduct under the said provision would be of a less stringent nature considering the fact that fraudulent acts are usually undertaken in a clandestine manner.

In Sanjeev Mohan Ahluwalia V. Union of India,[44] the Court held that prior approval of the government is not required for placing an amended memorandum of association and article of association before the extra-ordinary general meeting of a company for its consideration.

In Jindal Stainless Limited v. Moorgate Industries India,[45] the Court observed that while contemplating sanction of a scheme of demerger and transfer under Section 391 & 394 of the 1956 Act and Section 230 of the Companies Act 2013, the Court is required only to verify whether the same violates any provision of law or is unconscionable or militates against public policy, and the Court is not required to examine the commercial wisdom of the scheme. The Court further observed that upon the scheme being sanctioned, it operates as law and binds third parties as well.

In Jayant Ghadia v. Hindustan Tradex & Manufacturing Pvt. Ltd.,[46] the Court reiterated that when there was no confirmation of the appointment of an additional director in the succeeding annual general meeting of the company, then the appointment of the said additional director would lapse after the said meeting in terms of Section 260 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Constitutional Law

In Veterans Forum for Transparency in Public Life through Its General Secretary v. Union of India,[47] the Court held that it was not advisable to seek to implement an Act over a long period of time through executive orders alone, and that implementation of the Act should ideally be through the framing of appropriate rules, thereby reducing executive discretion.

In Sudhanshu M. Kumar v. Union of India,[48] the Court refused to entertain a writ petition challenging fixation of tariff orders by the Delhi Regulatory Commission under Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (‘Electricity Act’), in light of an alternative efficacious remedy of appeal being available under Section 111 of the Electricity Act.

In Corruption Against Society v. Lt. Governor of Delhi,[49] the Court deprecated the filing of a purported public interest litigation in relation to matters which fell within the domain of a private contract and that, too, without impleading the relevant parties.

In H.S. Rawat v. Central Board of Irrigation and Power,[50] the Court observed that the exercise of power by the President of India under Article 77(3) of the Constitution to remove a particular entity from government control, was the best indicator of the fact that the said entity was not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.

In ISNI Electric Power Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India,[51] the Court held that when an entitlement under an erstwhile policy was itself conditional in nature then promissory estoppel could not be invoked to resist compliance with the new policy which imposed new requirements for the entitlement in question.

In Somveer v. Union of India,[52] the Court held that once a relief has been declined on merits by a civil court while rejecting a suit, then the defeated party cannot seek to sidestep the said dismissal of the suit by filing a writ petition for the same relief, and the principle of res judicata would be attracted.

In Ram Kishan v. Delhi Cantonment Board,[53] the Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction would ordinarily not be exercised where there were serious factual disputes between the parties.

In Gulshan Bhatia v. State,[54]& in Komal Gupta v. State,[55] the Court reiterated that in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered to appoint the guardian of a person in a comatose state.

Consumer Protection and Real Estate Regulation

In Manvir Singh v. Board of Governors in Supersession of Medical Council of India,[56] while rejecting a challenge to the orders passed by the Delhi Medical Council (‘DMC’) and thereafter by the Medical Council of India (‘MCI’) absolving a doctor of charges of medical negligence, the Court however directed that the said reports would not come in the way of the aggrieved party from independently demonstrating an entitlement to damages and compensation before an appropriate forum, and yet further directed that the time spent in prosecuting the proceedings before the DMC as also the MCI would be kept in mind by the alternate forum while construing the question of limitation, if the aggrieved party were to approach it.

In DSS Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Manoj Kayal,[57]the Court noted with concern the phenomenon of passing of templated orders by a forum like the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in matters involving totally different factual scenarios, and observed that it demonstrated patent non-application of mind.

Contempt

In Om Prakash Singh v. GNCTD,[58] the Court reiterated that invocation of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (‘Contempt Act’), is not to be resorted to on mere conjecture.

In State v. Sukash @ SukeshChandrashekhar,[59] the Court held that if the compliance of an order passed by one court resulted in an ipso-facto non-compliance of an order passed by another court, then the latter act could not be said to fall within the meaning of contempt.

In ZeenyJhelumi v. Inderpreet Singh Jhelumi,[60] the Court observed that even an order passed by a court without jurisdiction is required to be complied with by the parties until the matter of jurisdiction is decided by a proper forum, particularly when the said order was primarily based on consent between the parties, and contempt proceedings would lie for breach of the said order.

In Shree Vijay Shanti SuriEucation Trust v. Arun Kumar Purohit,[61] the Court held that when an application for review of an order passed by the Court was pending, then it would not be appropriate to take any coercive measure in exercise of powers of contempt for non-compliance of the said order till the application was disposed of.

Contract Law

In Vesta Holding Private Limited v AKM Enterprises Private Limited,[62] the Court reiterated that in the absence of any proof of even a modicum of damages actually having been suffered, forfeiture of a pre-determined amount on the happening of a particular event in a contract could not be countenanced.

In Gini&Jony Ltd. v. Creons Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,[63] the Court reiterated that in the absence of a contract, either written or oral, specifying as to where payments are to be made, the general proposition that it was the debtor who was under an obligation to find the creditor and make payments, would apply.

Cooperative Law

In Jamia Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi,[64] the Court held that in terms of the scheme under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 (‘Cooperative Societies Act’), the right to appoint a returning officer to draw up a schedule for conduct of elections in the case of a cooperative bank vests with the government and not the outgoing managing committee of the bank. The Court further held that when the government had failed to so appoint a returning officer despite a timely request to the said effect by the outgoing managing committee, then there was no occasion for an administrator to be appointed to oversee the affairs of the cooperative bank under Section 35(5) of the Cooperative Societies Act and no fault could be attributed to the bank in this regard.

In RakeshRastogi v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation,[65]the Court reiterated in the context of permission granted for erection of a lift in a society building that a decision taken by the managing committee of a society, which comprises its elected executive, would bind all the members of the society.

Criminal Law and Procedure

In Ravinder Singh v. State,[66] the Court held that a proscription in the convict’s sentence denying any clemency till a particular period of imprisonment has elapsed cannot fetter exercise of power of pardon or computation as available to the President under Article 72 or the Governor under the Article 161 of the Constitution. The Court further observed that such proscription on clemency could also not bar the consideration of the accused’s application for grant of furlough.

In Rana Pratap Singh v. Director General (Prison Head Quarters Govt. of NCT of Delhi),[67] while upholding the practice of forwarding an application for furlough of the convicted Border Security Force (‘BSF’) constable to the Director General, BSF under Section 128 of the Border Security Force Act, 1968 (‘BSF Act’), the Court observed that with the grant of furlough having the ultimate effect of reducing the rigor of a sentence, it would fall within the scope of mitigation of sentence.

In Sharmila @ Nanhi v. State,[68] the Court observed that not much weight should be given to fact that the injury suffered by the victim was described as a mere ‘laceration’ as opposed to an ‘incised wound’, and that it would not detract from a conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (‘IPC’) inasmuch as emergency medicine providers commonly use the former term to describe any break in the skin.

In Umesh Latta v. The State,[69]the Court held that an aluminum walking stick used by the accused who was of an advanced age cannot be said to be a weapon of offence which could be used with the intent to kill any person and therefore, the offence under Section 308 of the IPC could not be said to have been made out, though the offence under Section 323 of the IPC i.e. voluntarily causing hurt could be established.

In Union of India v. MridulaKapur,[70]the Court observed that even though proceeds of crime in the hands of person who is not accused of or any crime in money laundering can be attached in proceedings under PMLA, when in the connected proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 the assets sought to be attached had already been declared to be legitimate and acquired from known sources of income, the same could not be categorized as proceeds of crime.

In Vishalakshi Goel v. Union of India,[71] the Court emphasized the importance of wording a First Information Report (‘FIR’) in a manner which was comprehensible to the common man and discouraged the use of archaic expressions which were no longer in common parlance.

In State v. Gaurav @ Mohit,[72] the Court observed that the admitted factum of a loan having been availed of by the complainant from the family members of the accused coupled with visible improvements in the case of the complainant would demonstrate a reasonable possibility of the criminal law having been set in motion to avoid repayment of the loan.

In Nikhil Saxena v. State,[73] the Court observed that in the absence of categorical proof that functional CCTV cameras were present at the spot of the incident, it could not be presumed from the mere mention of a CCTV pole in a scaled site plan that the CCTV cameras were, in fact, installed and functional and it could, therefore, not be alleged that the prosecution had withheld the best available evidence.

In Satyawati v. State,[74] the Court reiterated that permission to place on record additional evidence under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (‘Cr.P.C.’), should not be granted if a party had not availed of the opportunity to lead evidence at the relevant stage despite ample chances having been made available.

In Vipul Kumar v. State,[75] the Court reiterated that in the case of cross FIR’s though the cases are required to be decided independent of each other, however, in order to avoid conflicting decisions, it is essential that the judgment in both cases must be rendered one after the other in quick succession.

In Manohar Lal Kohli v. State (NCT of Delhi),[76] the Court held that when two varying orders framing charges against the accused were issued by the Trial Court on the same date, admittedly on account of inadvertence by the judge concerned, it would be apposite to set aside both the orders and remand the matter for fresh consideration.

In Noor Jahan v. State,[77] the Court held that the diametrically opposite accusations made by a child witness in the statement made by her before the Court and the statement recorded before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. would lead to serious doubts about the reliability of the said witness. Similarly, in State v. Vimal Kumar @ Karwa,[78] the Court upheld the acquittal of an accused in proceedings under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, (‘POCSO Act’), wherein the statement of the victim before the Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. and the statement given to the police authorities was found to be at variance.

In Firoza v. State,[79] the Court held that the mere fact that a dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and not a Judicial Magistrate as provided for under Chapter 13A of Vol. III of the Delhi High Court Rules, 1966 would not detract from the validity or trustworthiness of the said declaration.

In State v. Anil Kumar,[80] while upholding an order of acquittal of a charge of rape under Section 376 of the IPC, the Court opined that when the prosecutrix was admittedly not a minor on the date of the incident, then the absence of visible protest while the prosecutrix was being allegedly taken forcibly on a rickshaw in a public place could represent a possibility of her being a consenting party.

In State v. Jaiveer Singh,[81] the Court reiterated that when two possible views emerge from an examination of the evidence, then the prosecution cannot be said to have been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

In State v. Amar Pal,[82] while overturning an acquittal and convicting the accused of the offence of rape under Section 376 of the IPC, the Court observed that a false explanation offered by the accused could be used as an additional link to the chain of circumstantial evidence.

While elaborating upon the applicability of the last seen theory, the Court in Ram Badan Yadav @ Madan v. State[83] observed that the last seen evidence does not necessarily lead to an inference that the accused committed the crime, particularly when the time gap between the accused and the deceased being seen together and the deceased being found dead, is sufficiently large so as to open up the possibility of a person other than the accused being responsible for the crime.

In State v. Surender Kumar @ Pappey,[84] the Court reiterated that corroboration is not a sine-qua-non for conviction in a case of rape and the testimony of the victim of the sexual assault may suffice in itself in appropriate cases.

In Sandeep Kumar v. State,[85] the Court laid down detailed guidelines and devised a standard procedure to be followed by police of a particular State when they visit another State / Union Territory to make an arrest while investigating a complaint or an FIR disclosing a cognizable offence.

The Court in Ashok Jaiswal v. State (NCT of Delhi)[86]held that once the fact of penetration was established, then the mere fact that the hymen of the child was found intact would not absolve the accused of the offence punishable under section 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

In Krishma Rajput v. State (NCT of Delhi) @ Priya Thakur,[87]the Court found a refusal to participate in the Test Investigation Parade (‘TIP’) by the accused as a germane reason for refusing bail.

In Manjari Bakshi v. State,[88] the Court observed that when the facts of the case were such that all the evidence in relation to the alleged offence of the extortion was available with the complainant and no evidence was required to be produced by the prosecution, then a failure to place on record the said information by the complainant in the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C, would merit its dismissal.

In Parvez Ahmed Mir v. State (NCT of Delhi),[89] the Court observed that parole could be extended to persons convicted of terrorist activities only in exceptional circumstances.

In Chanderbhan v. State of Delhi,[90] the Court reiterated that a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C for quashing of a FIR would not be maintainable when it had been filed at the fag end of the trial, and the grounds urged for quashing pertained purely to factual aspects.

In Monu Kapoor v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,[91] the Court held that where the accused had failed to join the investigation on patently false pretexts and had exhibited non-cooperation with the investigating agency, then the anticipatory bail application was liable to be rejected on the said ground alone.

In Shamim Ahmed v. State,[92] the Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should ordinarily not be granted to an accused who has been declared as a proclaimed offender.

In Deepak Agrawal v. State,[93] the Court noted that the principle of issue of estoppel would not apply to a trial in cross cases which were registered on complaints of distinct complainants against a different set of accused persons.

In Jaidev v. State,[94] the Court observed that keeping in view the mandate of Section 33(5) of POCSO Act, it was impermissible to repeatedly callupon a child witness to testify.

In Kapil Tanwar v. The State (NCT of Delhi),[95] the Court reiterated that though at the stage of framing of charge there is no requirement to record reasons, however, recording of reasons is mandatory, if the court disagrees with the case of the police or the complainant.

In Raj Kumar v. State, [96] the Court held that in order to have a legitimate claim for compensation under Section 357 & 357A of the Cr.P.C., there must be requisite proof that there was a commission of offence and that the victim of such offence is properly identifiable and requires rehabilitation. The Court proceeded to issue a slew of directions to ensure systematic disbursal and determination of amounts from victim compensation funds.

In Sunil Agarwal v. Sunil Gupta,[97] the Court reiterated the inviolable mandate of Section 145 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881 (‘NI Act’), that the court is obliged to summon the person who has given evidence on affidavit in terms of Section 145(1), once the accused has filed an application under the former section.

In Payal Maheswari v. State,[98]the Court reiterated that there was no bar to a court treating an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr. P.C. as a complaint petition under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C.

In Rahul Devi Mandal v. State,[99] the Court observed that when the child-victim was demonstrably less than 13 years of age on the date of the incident, then the consent of the child was immaterial and the offences under Section 376 of the IPC as also Section 4 of the POCSO Act would be attracted, on the establishment of sexual relations by the accused with the child.

In Ramesh Chandra Kahturia v. State,[100] on an examination of Section 56 and 52 of the Delhi Excise Act, 2009 (‘Delhi Excise Act’), the Court opined that when an offense has been alleged to have been committed by a company, then the company necessarily has to be made an accused, and the officers or the directors of the company could not be prosecuted without the company being impleaded as an accused.

In Ravi v. State of Delhi,[101] the Court reiterated that the power to recall a witness under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised if the court came to a conclusion that the fairness of the Trial would be impacted otherwise.

In Shehzad v. State,[102] the Court held that the non-recovery of the knife which was used in the assault would by itself not be sufficient to vitiate a conviction under Section 397 of the IPC, if the nature of the injury and other evidence pointed to the fact that the knife was indeed used in the attack.

In Chetna v. State,[103]the Court reiterated that while exercising the power under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., an accused can be discharged only if it is demonstrated that the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce could under no circumstances establish the guilt of the accused during the course of the trial.In a similar vein in State v. Rakesh,[104] the Court reiterated that at the stage of charge, the appropriate test was one of ‘strong suspicion’. Further in State v. Vir Pal & Anr.,[105] it was further elaborated that if two views are made out at the said stage and only a case of suspicion, not amounting to a grave suspicion, was made out,then the accused should be given the benefit of doubt.

In Sumit Kumar Dedha v. State, NCT of Delhi,[106]the Court reiterated that a witness could not be recalled on the sole ground that there was a change of counsel representing the accused.

While elaborating upon the powers of the Sessions Court exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 386 of the Cr.P.C, the Court in Sushila Bhatt v. The State (NCT of Delhi),[107] reiterated that where there was no allegation that the trail court had failed to decide any issues raised during the trial and the allegation was of non-appreciation of evidence in the correct perspective, then it was not proper for the Sessions Court to remand the matter and the correct course would be for the Sessions Court to hear and decide the appeal on the merits.

In Manoj Kumar v. State,[108]the Court reiterated that an ossification test is not conclusive proof as to the age of the victim.

In Rohit Valecha v. State,[109]the Court observed that when there were specific allegations of demand of money, cruelty and harassment against the accused, then it was not a fit case for discharging the accused of the offences under Section 498A and 406 of the IPC in exercise of powers under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.

In Ajit Kumar Yadav @ Achyut Das v. State of NCT Delhi,[110] the Court observed that when a Court was dealing with a cancellation report filed by the police, then no enquiry or trail could be said to be pending before the Ld. Metropolitian Magistrate so as to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Cr. P.C. and to summon additional accused.

In Ashok Kumar @ Ashoki v. State (GNCT of Delhi),[111]the Court quashed proceedings under Section 25, 45 and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959 (‘Arms Act’) upon finding that the complainant in the case was also the investigating officer and there was nothing on record to indicate that on the date of the complaint there was no other investigating officer available at concerned police station. In Prerna Singh v. State,[112] the Court adopted the same course of action in a case under the provisions of the Delhi Prevention of Defacement of Property Act, 2007.

In Ayush Jain v. State[113]and Bhagayshree Digambar Mungre v. Small Farmers Consortium[114]the Court reiterated that when it was demonstrated that the director of the accused company in the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act had not signed the cheque in question and yet further had admittedly resigned from the company prior to the issuance of the cheque, then the proceedings against the said director were unsustainable.

In Chandra Prabha Khanna v. CBI,[115] the Court held that when an accused was admittedly unable to write and speak on account of certain medical conditions, then the process of recording of a statement under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. could not be completed.

In Jasmer Singh v. Jai Singh Sadana,[116] the Court rejected an argument that merely because a person had affixed dissimilar signatures on different documents filed before the Court, he/she would be liable to be prosecuted under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C.

In Kartar Singh v. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi),[117]the Court observed that when the entire evidence was available with the complainant, then the appropriate course would be for the Magistrate to take cognizance of the complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. instead of issuing directions under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C.

In Mahmood AsadMadani v. Central Bureau of Investigation,[118] the Court reiterated that in order to establish the commission of an offence under Section 420 of the IPC, it is essential to prove the existence of the mens-rea on the part of the accused.

In Manmohan Sharma v. State,[119] the Court observed that when there was no mention of an allegation of outraging of modesty in the initial complaint by the complainant, which contained only allegations of verbal abuse, then a subsequent complaint filed under Section 200/202 of Cr.P.C. seeking to include the said averment for the first time would be viewed with the suspicion.

In Pawan Kumar Gupta v. State,[120] the Court upheld the finding that once a plea of juvenility had been raised all the way up to the Supreme Court and had been duly considered and rejected, then an application under Section 7A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 could not be filed before any court seeking to reagitate the said issue.

In Sakshi Mehta v. State,[121] the Court reiterated that in the absence of the recognition of the concept of marital rape in India, no proceedings under Section 376 of the IPC would lie against the husband on allegations of forcible sexual relations having been established with the wife.

In Anuj Tandon v. State NCT of Delhi,[122] the Court reiterated that in the absence of a notice raising demand for payment under Section 138(1)(b) of the NI Act within the stipulated period, proceedings under Section 138 could not be maintained.

In Shubham Bansal v. The State (Gov. of NCT of Delhi),[123] the Court observed that the legislative intent was that when a protest petition seeking further investigation filed by the complainant was pending consideration before the Magistrate, then it was proper for the investigating officer to refrain from submitting the final report till a direction was issued by the Magistrate in respect of the pending petition/complaint.

In Amarjeet v. State,[124] the Court held that mere fact that the accused and his wife used to quarrel frequently cannot lead to an inference that the wife would have tutored the daughter to falsely implicate the accused in a case of sexual assault.

In Food Inspector v. Pushottam Kumar,[125] the Court held that inasmuch as the offence of adding color to food articles was punishable under both Section 16(1)(a) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 as also Section 59(i) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (‘FSS Act’), the provisions of the FSS Act providing for a comparatively lesser period of punishment should be applied to the benefit of the accused.

In Rajinder Singh v. Black Gravel Infracon Pvt. Ltd.,[126] the Court held that in order to bring home vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act, it was essential to demonstrate that the accused was in charge of the affairs or responsible for the conduct of the accused company.

In Praveen Bansal & Anr. v. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi ),[127] the Court refused to quash a proceeding under Section 304A of the IPC by mutual consent inasmuch as it observed that when it was clear that illegal construction had been raised in a negligent manner resulting in severe loss of life, such quashing was not justified.

Disability Law and Mental Health

In Ankit Kumar Shukla v. Union Public Service Commission,[131] the Court observed that contradictory or ambiguous opinions by different medical boards as to the extent of disability suffered by an applicant should not lead to a summary rejection of his/her candidature, and the appropriate methodology would be to seek an opinion from an appellate medical board.

In MohitAhlawat v. Union of India,[132] the Court held that for grant of disability pension in terms of Rule 3-A of the Civil Services Extraordinary Pension Rules, 1972 there was no distinction between temporary and permanent disability. The Court further opined that it was a manifest contradiction on the part of a medical board to opine that a person be boarded out of service on account of being permanently unfit to even undergo training, and at the same time categorizing a disability as high as 58.47% as being temporary in nature.

Education

In Mohammed AsiphShahid Ali v. University Of Delhi,[133] the Court held that once the eligibility of a candidate on the basis of his caste was not in doubt, the mere delay in placing on record the proof of such eligibility on account of bureaucratic inaction cannot be used to deny admission to a candidate and that upholding such a stand would result in a complete negation of the concept of affirmative action.

In Mallika Malhotra v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University,[134]the Court held that mere delay in payment of balance amount of fee during the admission process cannot ipso-facto result in cancellation of admission if no such explicit condition was provided for in the admission brochure.

In University of Delhi v. Praveen Sagar,[135] the Court held that the eligibility for a particular course has to be reckoned as on the date when admission is offered, and when a supplementary examination for a relevant qualifying course is successfully cleared by the candidate on a later date, then the attainment of eligibility could not be said to relate back.

In Sanjeev Kumar v. National Testing Agency,[136] the Court held that in multiple-choice question based examinations the general principle that examinees are required to look at the closest or most appropriate answers, would not apply to a case where the answer involves a specific individual, author, analyst, or inventor and a spelling mistake in the name of the individual will obviously create confusion in the minds of the candidates.

In Shubham Garg v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University,[137] the Court opined that in a situation where a University had admittedly invited applications for migration to changed branches/disciplines of study, and the concerned affiliated institutions had also given their assent to the received applications followed by the concerned students regularly attending classes in the changed branch/discipline for the better part of the academic year, then an abrupt rejection of the applications for migration by the University could not be countenanced.

In Mohammad RehalAlam v. Central Board of Secondary Education,[138] the Court observed that a petition for change of date of birth in the school leaving certificate issued by a Board would also be subjected to the regime of delay and laches, and an unexplained long delay in seeking the correction, even after the aggrieved party had attained majority, would be a valid ground for rejecting a petition filed on this account.

In Animesh v. Central Board of Secondary Education,[139] the Court held that general instructions issued by the Board for marking of papers was not mandatory but directory in nature, and further stressed on the need for an effective methodology to be put in place for avoiding errors in the process of evaluation inasmuch as even a fraction of a mark is often decisive as regards the prospects of admission and may seriously affect the chances of a deserving candidate.

In Arti Devi v. Jawaharlal Nehru University,[140] the Court observed that a complete lockdown of the administrative building of a functioning university could not be countenanced.

In Shubhdeep Ayurved Medical College & Hospital v. Union of India,[141] the Court opined that even in the case of a running educational institution, there was no obligation on the concerned statutory authority to permit increased intake without establishing satisfaction of the requirements of Section 13A(8)(c) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970.

In Rajpati Mata Prasad ShikshakPrasashikhanMahavidyalaya v. National Council for Teacher Education,[142] the Court observed that the mere delay in arranging for approval of faculty on account of the fact that the affiliating university had changed, could not automatically lead to a rejection of an application made for the recognition of a particular course but would only mean that the approval granted would become operational from the next academic session alone.

Election Law

In New Delhi Young Men’s Christian Association v. National Council YMCAs of India,[143] the Court observed that the mere fact that a person was elected to a particular post unopposed would not by itself invalidate the election in question, particularly when the decision to disqualify the other candidates was itself not called into question.

In Arun Kumar v. Dr. Harsh Vardhan,[144] the Court observed that even though non-disclosure of assets and sources of income would constitute a corrupt practice, a mere dichotomy in the purchase price of an asset in different affidavits would not ipso-facto equate to a constitutionally impermissible conduct and it would be for the person challenging the election of the elected candidate to demonstrate that this difference in valuation/ purchase price would adversely affect the choice made by a voter. The Court observed that in the absence of the said averments, the petition could not be said to disclose any material particulars and was liable for in-limine dismissal.

Evidence

After a detailed examination of the law pertaining to the admissibility of recoveries effected pursuant to disclosure statements made by accused persons, the Court in Sonu @ Ashutosh Tiwari v. State,[145]observed that the basic principle enshrined under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’), is that of confirmation by subsequent events, and that any information emanating from the accused, though confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, becomes reliable information if it results in discovery of a relevant fact.

Insurance and Motor Vehicles Act

In Dincy Devassy v. United India Insurance Company,[146] the Court held that the re-marriage of a widow would not in any manner impact her right to be compensated for the loss of dependency on account of the unnatural demise of her husband.

In Mala Sahni Seth v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.,[147] the Court deprecated the stand of the insurance company which sought to term the death of person who had met with a fatal accident while riding a high-powered motorcycle as being a ‘self-inflicted’ injury.

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Surinder Nijhawan,[148] while upholding a decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (‘MACT’)refusing the right of recovery from the owner of the offending vehicle to the insurance company, the Court noted that when the insurer was unable to demonstrate that there was a statutory requirement of the driver undertaking any prior specific skill-test for driving on a hill-road then the mere requirement in a rule specific to a particular State that an endorsement to this effect was required in the driving license, would not invalidate the license of the driver in the absence of such an endorsement.

In Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anita,[149] the Court held that merely because an employee who had been left disabled on account of an accident had been retained by the employer in employment, possibility on humanitarian grounds, would not in any manner diminish the fact that the said employee’s functionality was indeed reduced on account of the said accident and consequent disability and requisite compensation would be payable.

In National Insurance Company v. Geeta,[150] the Court observed that inasmuch as the maximum unladed weight to be classified as a Light Motor Vehicle (‘LMV’) was 7500 kilograms, a person driving a vehicle above the said limit with a license for driving a LMV alone would evidence a clear breach of the insurance policy.

In Pinky v. Rajeev,[151] the Court held that licenses issued by the transport department recognising a deceased person as a three-seater auto rickshaw driver, are by themselves testimony to the requisite skill in this regard being possessed by him/her, and accordingly the deceased would be entitled to be treated as a skilled workman for the purposes of computation of compensation.

In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohammed Ayan,[152] the Court granted the right to recovery against the owner of the offending vehicle in question inasmuch as it was established that the vehicle which was registered as a private vehicle was in fact being used for public purposes as a commercial vehicle in clear breach of the insurance policy.

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dincy Devassy,[153] the Court observed that a very low income earned by the father of the deceased son, which would be grossly insufficient to cater to the needs of his family, would also be a cogent factor in establishing dependency upon the son and consequent compensation for the same.

In Nazruddin v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,[154] the Court allowed a plea for amendment of the reply to the claim petition of the owner of the offending vehicle inasmuch as it noted that the amendment was sought at an early stage in the proceedings, and the lack of literacy of the party seeking the amendment was also a relevant mitigating factor.

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Rishabh Dheer, Amol Acharya, Bharat Rayadurgam and Piyo Harold Jaimon, Advocates, and Rahul Mohan Sharma, Ibansara Syiemlieh and Shivam Gupta, Law Interns.

[1] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 220/2019.

[2] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in ARB. A. (COMM.) 31/2019

[3] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 173/2019 (DB).

[4] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 293/2018 (DB).

[5] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in FAO (OS) 229/2010 (DB).

[6] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in FAO (OS) (COMM) 184/2018 (DB).

[7] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 503/2019.

[8] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in ARB. P. 224/2019.

[9] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in ARB. P. 434/2019.

[10] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in O.M.P. (COMM) 202/2018.

[11] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 90/2019.

[12] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 inF.A.O. 460/2019.

[13] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in Ex. P. No.198/2012.

[14] (2012) 9 SCC 552

[15] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 2404/2019 (DB).

[16] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL.A. 508/2019.

[17] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 234/2019.

[18] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 13713/2018.

[19] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in RSA 239/2019.

[20] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CM (M) 1827/2019.

[21] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in F.A.O. 325/2016.

[22] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in CM (M) 1814/2019.

[23] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in RFA (OS) 72/2018 (DB).

[24] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in CM (M) 1714/2019.

[25] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in CM (M) 1787/2019.

[26] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in CM (M) 856/2016.

[27] Judgment dated 20.12.2019 in F.A.O. (OS) (COMM) 373/2019 (DB).

[28] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in EX. P. 275/2012.

[29] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in CS (OS) 3316/2015.

[30] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CS (OS) 1379/2015.

[31] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CS (OS) 633/2019.

[32] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CM (M) 1375/2018.

[33] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 10040/2019.

[34] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CM (M) 1457/2019.

[35] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CM (M) 1763/2019.

[36] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CM (M) 944/2018.

[37] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in RFA 760/2019.

[38] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in RFA 332/2010.

[39] Judgment dated 19.12.2019 in RFA 66/2019.

[40] Judgment dated 16.12.2019 in CO. APP. 10/2019 (DB).

[41] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 13775/2019 (DB).

[42] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in BAIL APPLN No. 2154/2019.

[43] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CO. PET. 379/2009.

[44] Judgment dated 19.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 8037/2019.

[45] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in O.M.P. (I) (COMM.) 333/2016.

[46] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in EX. P. No. 79/2014.

[47] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 4428/2016 (DB).

[48] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 8653/2017 (DB).

[49] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 13749/2019 (DB).

[50] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in L.P.A. 627/2015 (DB).

[51] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in L.P.A. 35/2013 (DB).

[52] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 12712/2019.

[53] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 2976/2018.

[54] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 4697/2019.

[55] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 4937/2019.

[56] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in W.P.(C) 12816/2019

[57] Judgment dated 29.12.2019 in CM(M) 1701/2019

[58] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in CONT.CAS (C) 1124/2016 (DB).

[59] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in CRL.M.C. 6555/2019.

[60] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in CONT.CAS(C) 516/2018 (DB).

[61] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in CONT. CAS (C) 1042/2019

[62] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in CS(OS) 1020/2009.

[63] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in RFA 942/2019.

[64] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in W.P.(C) 12817/2019 (DB).

[65] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 9056/2018

[66] Judgment dated 20.12.2019 in W.P. (CRL) 2428/2018.

[67] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in W.P. (CRL) 1817/2018.

[68] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in CRL. A. 962/2019.

[69] Judgment dated 16.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1412/2019.

[70] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. A. 801/2018.

[71] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 6183/2018 (DB).

[72] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in CRL. L.P. 659/2019 (DB).

[73] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1244/2018 (DB).

[74] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CRL. A. 115/2019 (DB).

[75] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. A. 171/2019 (DB).

[76] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 287/2017.

[77] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1218/2019 (DB).

[78] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CRL. L. P. 526/2019 (DB).

[79] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in CRL. A. 243/2016 (DB).

[80] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in CRL. A. 97/2015 (DB).

[81] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CRL. L. P.534/2019 (DB).

[82] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1309/2013 (DB).

[83] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CRL. A. 52/2019(DB).

[84] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in CRL. A. 79/2009(DB).

[85] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in W.P (CRL.) No.2189/2018 (DB).

[86] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1127/2019.

[87] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in BAIL APPLN. 2823/2019.

[88] Judgment dated 23.12.2019 in W.P. (CRL) 482/2019.

[89] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in W.P. (CRL) 2470/2019.

[90] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 6381/2019.

[91] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in BAIL APPLN. 2381/2019.

[92] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in BAIL APPLN. 1845/2019.

[93] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 966/2019.

[94] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4412/2019.

[95] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 65/2016.

[96] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in CRL. A. 187/2018.

[97] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 6061/2019.

[98] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 6355/2019.

[99] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1117/2015.

[100] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4348/2019.

[101] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 6301/2019.

[102] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. A. 1206/2015.

[103] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 1094/2018.

[104] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 291/2018.

[105] Judgment dated 20.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 677/2018.

[106] Judgment dated 20.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 722/2018.

[107] Judgment dated 19.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 716/2016.

[108] Judgment dated 20.12.2019 in BAIL APPLN. 2552/2019.

[109] Judgment dated 17.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 3229/2019.

[110] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 2095/2017.

[111] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4544/2019.

[112] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 2601/2019.

[113] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 2028/2017.

[114] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 5005/2019.

[115] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 6226/2019.

[116] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 1695/2017.

[117] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4192/2019.

[118] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4956/2017.

[119] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4060/2019.

[120] Judgment dated 19.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 1301/2019.

[121] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 19/2017.

[122] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 4454/2017.

[123] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in CRL. M. C. 2024/2018.

[124] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in CRL. A. 580/2016.

[125] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL. A. 772/2017.

[126] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in CRL. L. P. 701/2019.

[127] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in W.P. (CRL) 2805/2019.

[128] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in RFA 222/2019

[129] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 755/2018.

[130] Judgment dated 06.12.2019 in CRL. REV. P. 751/2018.

[131] Judgment dated 13.12.2019 in W.P.(C) 13200/2019 (DB).

[132] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in W.P.(C) 10769/2017 (DB).

[133] Judgment dated 16.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 9525/2019.

[134] Judgment dated 27.12.2019 in W.P.(C) 10905/2019.

[135] Judgment dated 03.12.2019 in L.P.A. 729/2019 (DB).

[136] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 8664/2019.

[137] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in L.P.A. 475/2019 (DB).

[138] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in L.P.A. 203/2017 (DB).

[139] Judgment dated 02.12.2019 in L.P.A. 120/2019 (DB).

[140] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 9407/2019.

[141] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in L.P.A. 645/2019 (DB).

[142] Judgment dated 24.12.2019 in W.P. (C) 1672/2019.

[143] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in FAO(OS) 194/2019 (DB).

[144] Judgment dated 04.12.2019 in EL.PET. 7/2019

[145] Judgment dated 11.12.2019 in CRL.A. 859/2017(DB).

[146] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 26/2019

[147] Judgment dated 18.12.2019 in CM(M) 1749/2019

[148] Judgment dated 05.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 821/2016

[149] Judgment dated 09.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 912/2018

[150] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 67/2018

[151] Judgment dated 10.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 642/2018

[152] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 172/2019

[153] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in MAC. APP. 779/2018

[154] Judgment dated 12.12.2019 in CM (M) 1802/2019