Dr. Amit George

With its vast and varied case-docket, the Delhi High Court has occasion to pronounce verdicts on diverse subjects and myriad areas of law. This two-part monthly column attempts to offer a brief overview of the important pronouncements of the Delhi High Court rendered over the course of the month. While an attempt has been made to ensure the widest possible coverage of the various judgments rendered, comprehensive analysis and critique of the individual judgments is eschewed for the sake of brevity.

Below are the judgments from the Delhi High Court for the month of August, segregated as per practice areas.

Arbitration

In Glencore International AG v. Indian Potash Ltd. & Anr.,[1] the Delhi High Court held that there is no such fundamental over-arching requirement under Indian law that adjudicating authorities, including arbitral tribunals, are mandatorily required to render a decision on jurisdictional issues at the preliminary stage, and before hearing the matter on merits.

In Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ipex Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.,[2] the Court held that though a ground may have been included in the body of the petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, if the said ground was not specifically urged during the course of oral hearing of the matter, then the said ground could not be permitted to be resuscitated and pressed at the stage of the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

While considering the power of the arbitrator to interpret and construe the terms of the agreement, the Court in Visionindia Ayurved Pvt. Ltd. v. N. K. Sharma, Proprietor[3] held that though the arbitrator is required in the usual course of things to go by the plain terms of the agreement, if there exists a latent ambiguity in the said terms, then it is open to the arbitrator to utilize alternative interpretative tools, such as the subsequent conduct of the parties.

The Court in Kadimi International Pvt. Ltd. v. Emaar MGF Land Ltd.[4] and Sriram Electrical Works v. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.[5] has reiterated that the independence and impartiality provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 do not take away the right of a party to make a unilateral appointment of the arbitrator(s) if the agreement between the parties so permits. What is proscribed is only the appointment of a person who is otherwise ineligible to act as an arbitrator in the context of the independence and impartiality provisions under the Act.

In Bata India Ltd. v. AVS International Pvt. Ltd.,[6] the Court reiterated that Section 18 of the Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development (‘MSMED’) Act, 2006 would override the arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties.

In Krishna Construction v. Fakhruddin Memorial Cooperative Group Housing Society (Regd.),[7] the Court held that when a contract, which contained an arbitration clause, has been put to an end by mutual consent and a new agreement is substituted in its place, then it is the terms of this successor agreement that would determine the intention, or the lack thereof, of the parties to proceed to arbitration. If the terms of the successor agreement do not contain an arbitration clause, and the terms thereof record that all previous agreements would stand nullified, then the inference would be that the arbitration clause has also perished.

In Delhi Development Authority v. Ashok Kumar & Co.,[8] the Court held that once the executing court had been moved for execution of an award by treating it as a decree in terms of Section 36 of the Arbitration Act, then it is the said court which would have the jurisdiction to hear an application for restitution of any amount under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’), and not the arbitral tribunal.

In CDR. S. P. Puri (Retd.) v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee,[9] the Court considered Rule 4 (which inter-alia provides for an outer-time limit for filing of a counter-claim) and Rule 10 (which permits the Arbitrator to allow additional counter-claims) of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre Rules, and held that while a co-joint reading of the same would demonstrate that even though the said rules were intended to achieve expeditious conclusion of the proceedings, they were ultimately rules of procedure which would have to bend to the demands of substantive justice.

Banking and Finance

In Sanjeev Kumar Kakkar & Ors. v. Tata Capital Housing Finance Limited & Ors.,[10] the Delhi High Court had the occasion to consider Section 34 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) and held that merely because certain disputed questions of fact are sought to be articulated would not mean that a civil court could assume jurisdiction over the matter. It was held that every dispute between the mortgagor and the bank or a third party cannot be taken out from the ambit of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act through this method, the only exception being if there is a cogent allegation of a fraudulent act on the part of the secured creditor.

In Munish Kumar Bhunsali v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.,[11] the Court held that while considering an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the magistrate concerned is not acting in an adjudicatory capacity nor is he/she obliged to give notice to the borrower. The magistrate is only required to see that the requirements of the SARFAESI Act and the attendant rules are duly satisfied in the affidavit filed on behalf of the secured creditor, and he/she can then immediately proceed to pass an order in this regard.

The Court in IFCI Factors Ltd. v. Ramsarup Industries Ltd. & Ors.,[12] and in IFCI Factors Ltd. v. Innoventive Industries Ltd. & Ors.[13] held that the Factoring Regulation Act, 2011 does not bar a summary suit under Order XXXVII of the CPC if the suit is for an ascertainable and liquidated sum.

Civil Procedure

In Narendra Sharma & Anr. v. Veena Solanki & Ors.,[14] the Delhi High Court held that the allegation that certain additional documents sought to be placed on record should be struck-off as they were obtained in an illegal manner is not an issue that can be gone into at a preliminary stage.

The Court in Balvir & Others v. Delhi Jal Board & Anr.[15] held that when a competent proceeding had already been launched before the Finance Commissioner under the East Punjab Holdings Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1948, then parallel proceedings for the same relief cannot be maintained before a civil court.

In BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Golf Technologies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.,[16] the Court held that when the director of a company had admitted the outstanding electricity dues owed by the company, and had addressed a communication containing a personal assurance of payment of the said dues, then in a suit filed by the electricity utility for recovery of the amount, the director could not seek to have his name struck off from the list of parties at a preliminary stage.

While determining the question of maintainability, the Court in Nav Shakti Educational Society v. Laxman Public School Society & Ors.[17] held that an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) of the CPC cannot be maintained against an order passed in an appeal filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) CPC pursuant to the bar contained in Section 104 (2) of the CPC.

In Avneet Singh Bedi & Anr. v. Inder Pal Singh & Ors.,[18] the Court held that even where the facts would demonstrate a weak case, unless the case discloses no cause of action or is barred by any law, summons should be issued to the defendants.

In Netrapal Singh v. Ravinder Kumar Kalyanai & Anr.,[19] the Court held that in a summary suit, when the defendant had clearly set out the grounds of defense and indicated its intention to contest the suit in a reply filed to the application filed by the plaintiff under Order XXXVII Rule 3(4) of the CPC, then the omission to file a specific application under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the CPC could be ignored in the interests of justice, and the reply could be treated as an application for leave to defend.

In Parkland Properties Ltd v. New Rajput Cooperative Group Housing Society,[20] the Court held that when there was a stipulation in an order that if no payment was made within a specified period then the suit would stand automatically decreed, then in such a case no application for seeking extension of time to make payment can be maintained after the expiry of the period so granted.

Commercial Courts

Reiterating the strict timelines introduced by the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015, the Delhi High Court in Ravinder v. Subhash Gupta [21] restated that the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC are compulsory and the outside limit of 120 days for filing of a written statement is mandatory in nature.

In Red Bull AG v. Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd & Anr.,[22] it was held that in a commercial suit when the defendant appears in court at a very early stage of the proceedings after having been informed through various other sources about the pendency of the proceedings, and without any formal issuance of summons by the court, then it cannot be stated as an inflexible rule that such mere appearance equates to a service of summons upon the defendant so as to set the clock ticking for the filing of a written statement.

In Indian Style Wrestling Association of India & Anr. v. Wrestling Federation of India,[23] the Court held that once the written statement is filed within the stipulated time, then even if there are some defects in the same which are pointed out by the Registry and which take further time to rectify, it cannot be said that there is no filing of the written statement within the stipulated period stated under Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC.

In Kailash Devi Khanna & Ors. v. D.D. Global Capital Ltd. & Ors.,[24] it was clarified that all suits for recovery of monies do not fall within the ambit and scope of Section 2(1)(c)(i) of the Commercial Courts Act, and that a suit would have to be based on a transaction pertaining to mercantile documents to qualify thereunder.

In Tullio Giusi Spa v. House of Trims Pvt. Ltd.,[25] while setting out the general standards for framing of issues under the Commercial Courts Act, the Court held that only a specific, detailed and cogent denial can invite the framing of an issue and not otherwise.

Company Law and Insolvency

In IFCI Factors Ltd. v. Ramsarup Industries Ltd. & Ors. (supra), the Delhi High Court reiterated that the moratorium under Section 14 (1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 does not apply to a surety or guarantor. Further, in relation to the applicability of the moratorium, in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. &Ors. v. MIC Electronics Ltd. & Ors.,[26] the Court reiterated that unless the assets of the company are being jeopardized in any manner, Section 14 of the IBC does not come in the way of hearing a petition challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

In Ashok Manufacturing Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. Atul Nath & Ors.,[27] it was held that directions passed by the Company Law Board regarding the employees of a company, such as proscribing suspension or termination of employees, would constitute an ‘interim arrangement’ regarding management of the affairs of the company, and are permissible in exercise of powers under Section 403 of the Companies Act, 1956.

In Wholesale Trading Services Pvt. Ltd. v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India &Ors.,[28] the Court remarked that it was impermissible for a company to indulge in an organized activity that was totally alien to its Memorandum of Association.

While adjudicating upon the maintainability of a writ petition challenging a share buy-back initiated by a company, the Court in Nimish H. Shah & Anr. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr.[29] held that actions such as issuance of postal ballot etc. are purely within the remit of the Companies Act, 2013 and that a writ petition would not lie to interdict the same. The Court further observed that it does not have the necessary wherewithal to determine the appropriate and fair share value, and that such matters would fall outside the scope of judicial review.

In Deepak Khosla v. State of NCT of Delhi &Ors.,[30] it was held that when a person is a shareholder as also the legal heir of a deceased shareholder, then the said person is competent to maintain a petition under Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956.

Constitutional Law

In Nikhil Koblekar v. Union of India & Anr.,[31] the Delhi High Court held that while determining the constitutional validity of a legislation, a person cannot require the legislation to be tested against standards and procedures established under a similar legislation of a foreign country. As long as the domestic legislation is fair and reasonable, there can be no cavil with its constitutionality.

In M/s. Advantages India & Anr v. Union of India &Ors.,[32] the Delhi High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 43 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (‘FCRA’) and Rule 22 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Rules, 2011 (‘FCRR’). While reiterating the settled principles in this regard for gauging the constitutionality of a statute, the Court further held that the impugned provisions, which permitted transfer of cases mid-stream to specialized agencies like the Central Bureau Of Investigation, were valid and that possible overlapping of offences between the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’) and the FCRA would not impugn on the constitutional validity of the FCRA.

In Padamjit Singh v. NDMC & Anr.,[33] the Court held that while the right of hawkers to carry on vending activity is a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, the same was subject to reasonable restrictions, particularly in the context of the activity in question.

On a related note, the Delhi High Court in Manoj Kumar & Anr. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [34] observed that a policy for rehabilitation and relocation cannot be sought to be extended to rank encroachers upon public land.

In Sushila v. Airports Authority of India,[35] it was held that writ proceedings are not the appropriate forum for determination as to whether service tax is leviable on a particular activity which is being carried out inter-se the parties, and as to whom would be liable to bear the same, especially when the concerned service tax authorities were not even made a party to the case.

In Cement Corporation of India v. Saju S. Dominic & Ors.,[36] the Court noted that with the right to health being a fundamental right, it is permissible for an employee to get treatment in a non-government hospital in the case of an emergency, and he or she cannot be denied reimbursement of the actual expenses incurred.

In Manish Sharma v. Lt. Governor &Ors.,[37] it was held that the power of the Court to do complete justice under Article 226 of the Constitution extends, in the appropriate facts and circumstances, to directing adjustment of a candidate against a vacancy reserved for another category. The Court in the said case directed accommodation of a candidate belonging to the physically handicapped category against an unfilled vacancy from the scheduled tribe category.

In Rumy Chowdhury v. The Department of Revenue, Government of NCT, Delhi & Anr.,[38] the Court noted that the practice of issuance of a caste certificate to children based on the caste of the father is not without exceptions and it would be a relevant factor to examine if the children have grown up in a notified community or tribe and have suffered the attendant disadvantages and deprivations of belonging to the said community.

Cooperative Law

In Rajesh Kumar Garg v. Delhi State Cooperative Bank Ltd.,[39] the Court while considering the aspect of limitation for referring a dispute for resolution under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003 held that the Section 70 of the Act over-rides the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘Limitation Act’) inasmuch as it provides for special provision for disputes, and the limitation thereof, for being referred to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies.

 Criminal Law and Procedure

In Tabassum v. State of NCT, Delhi & Anr.,[40] the Delhi High Court held that an accused can be granted anticipatory bail before the process of declaration as a proclaimed offender concludes i.e. after publication in the newspaper and after a formal order declaring the accused as a proclaimed offender is passed by the court concerned.

In Ratul Puri v. Directorate of Enforcement,[41] the Court held that keeping in view the object of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘PMLA’), a refusal to supply to the accused the statement recorded under Section 50 at the initial stage of investigation is perfectly justified.

In Rajkumar Kuchhal v. Loyal Logistics Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,[42] the Court reiterated that the court of a Metropolitan Magistrate hearing a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (‘NI Act’) is not a recovery forum. Though settlement of disputes is always encouraged, when the court has passed no effective order bringing the proceedings to an end on the basis of a settlement, no proceedings for recovery of fine based on the said settlement can be initiated. The judgment of the High Court in Dayawati v. Yogesh Kumar Gosain[43] was distinguished.

In Saurabh v. State of NCT of Delhi, [44] the Court explained that the statement of an accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘Cr.PC’) is not substantive evidence which can be singularly used to hold him guilty. However, where there is a refusal to explain, or the offering of a vague denial, or tendering of a false defense, then the court may draw an adverse inference against the accused.

In Ashok Chawla & Ors. v. Central Bureau of Investigation,[45] the Court held that it was impermissible for the Central Bureau of Investigation to have withheld the report of investigation under Section 173 of the Cr.PC even long after having filed a complaint under Section 13 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, and it is desirable that the report of investigation be also submitted before the court in the contemporaneous period of, if not simultaneous to, the presentation of the complaint under Section 13 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923.

In Narendra Singh & Ors. v. Enforcement Directorate & Anr.,[46] the Court held that there was no absolute bar on the power of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with a show-cause notice issued under Section 51 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (‘FERA Act’) at the stage of adjudication and that interference was permissible where the basic and foundational facts necessary for proceeding with such adjudication were demonstrably absent.

In Imran v. State,[47] while commenting on the value of a Test Identification Parade (‘TIP’), it was held that the same, while useful in determining the initial direction of the investigation, does not amount to substantive evidence. Even in the absence of a TIP, a witness could always identify an accused for the first time in the court during the proceedings.

In Dinesh v. State,[48] the Court opined that the information relating to past user or history of a recovered article is inadmissible in evidence and only the factum of the place from where the article is recovered is admissible in evidence.

In Ankit Ashok Jalan v. Union of India,[49] while reiterating the parameters for passing an order of preventive detention, the Court held that when the detenues are in judicial custody and no bail applications are pending, and there being no imminent possibility of release on bail, it would not be proper to exercise the power of preventive detention.

In Ghulam Mohd. Bhat v. National Investigating Agency, [50] it was reiterated that Section 43(D)(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) operates as a non-obstante clause, and if the Court finds that the allegations are prima facie true, then the accused cannot be released on bail.

In Pankaj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India &Ors.,[51] the Court held that the when the facts demonstrate that a person has the ‘propensity as well as potentiality’ to indulge in acts of smuggling goods, then a detention order under the Conservation Of Foreign Exchange and Prevention Of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (‘COFEPOSA’) is justified.

In Riyaz Khan v. State,[52] the Court held that when a convict’s conduct, as demonstrated from the nominal roll, had been found to be extremely unsatisfactory inasmuch he had indulged in multiple acts of violence and indiscipline while incarcerated, it would be a ground for the Court to refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction which is only intended for those who approach the Court with “clean hands and good conduct”.

In S.K. Bhatia v. Central Bureau of Investigation,[53] the Court reiterated that mere recovery of the bribe would not be determinative of the guilt of the accused, and that there was a need to adduce reliable evidence in relation to demand and acceptance of bribe money. The Court stressed on the need for videography of the trap proceedings to ensure that the prosecution’s case is not weakened subsequently when contradictions in the witness testimony emerge during the course of the trial.

In Central Bureau of Investigation v. State & Anr.,[54] the Court considered the ramifications of not obtaining sanction under Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 (‘DPA’) and its effect on the charge, and concluded that the issue of sanction raised goes to the root of the matter, and the accused were entitled to be discharged in the absence of the necessary sanction.

While dealing with a similar issue, the Court in The State v. Shambhu Dayal & Ors.[55] held that the action of the Station House Officer (‘SHO’) in arresting an accused pursuant to the lodging of a First Information Report (‘FIR’) is an act done in the discharge of official duty and the same cannot be termed as amounting to wrongful confinement.

The Court in Md. Muslim v. State [56] distinguished the judgment of the Supreme Court arising out of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’) in Arif Khan v. State of Uttarakhand [57] and it was held that the recovery of the drug having been made from the body of a person in the case at hand, as opposed to having been made from a vehicle in the case of Arif Khan (supra), compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not mandatory.

In Shankar Adawal v. The Central Bureau of Investigation, [58] the Court held that despite a document having been labeled as ‘secret’, it was still necessary to scrutinize the contents of the same before it could be determinately held that any offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 was made out. Since the documents in question had been already made public, therefore, they lost their confidentiality.

In Mohd. Anis v. State,[59] the Court conclusively held that there was no reverse burden of proof on the prosecution to prove that the injuries suffered by the complainant were not self-inflicted when an allegation to this effect was made by the accused. The primary onus remained that of the accused to demonstrate during the course of the trial that the injuries of the complainant were self-inflicted.

In Chhotey Lal v. State Government, NCT of Delhi,[60] it was held that the disclosure and the subsequent recovery of the case property, even if believed, would not ipso facto determine the guilt of an accused for the offence under Section 397 of the IPC, especially since there was a gap of more than 3 days between the disclosure and the recovery.

After a review of the applicable principles, the Delhi High Court in Lalita Saini v. State & Anr. [61] held that the stipulated period for filing of a charge-sheet for an offence punishable under Section 409 of the IPC would be a period of 90 days and not 60 days.

In State v. Kaishar Ali,[62] the Court, while considering a case emanating under the Protection Of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (‘POCSO Act’), held that when a misrepresentation by the prosecutrix as to her not being a minor had resulted in the accused person having permitted the prosecutrix to accompany him and they had established physical relations subsequently, the accused could not be said to have possessed the requisite mens rea for any offence under Section 6 of the POCSO or Sections 363, 366 and 367 of the IPC to have been made out.

Further, in State v. Trilok Aggarwal & Anr.,[63] the Court upheld the acquittal of the accused from the offences mentioned in Sections 376(2)(g) and 506 of the IPC while agreeing with the trial court that the exchange of letters pointed to the existence of a romantic relationship and the possibility of the prosecutrix being a consenting party could not be ruled out.

In Pramod v. State,[64] the Court has reiterated that the testimony of a sole witness, if overall consistent and trustworthy, can form the basis of conviction of the accused even if certain minor discrepancies are pointed out by the defence. It was held that human memory is imperfect and that no witness can be expected to narrate an incident in a “parrot-like manner and flawlessly.”

In Lekhraj v. State,[65] the Court considered the argument that the prosecution’s case as regards a murder which was committed in a public place was false inasmuch as it was urged that if a number of public persons were present at the spot, then the convict would not have managed to flee from the scene. The Court upheld the conviction of the accused on the basis of the testimony of a witness who was 9 years old at the time of the incident. It was noted that though the court must be very careful while weighing the testimony of a witness of such a tender age, if the same is found to be consistent and the same inspires confidence, then there is no illegality in relying upon the same.

In Dinesh Singh Panwar v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi,[66] the Court reiterated that the benefit of a defective investigation cannot accrue to the accused persons.

In a matter involving an appeal against the acquittal of the husband in a dowry-death case, the Court in Gadadhar Panda v. The State & Anr.[67] while dealing with an argument centering around the aspect of ‘special knowledge’ under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, held that when the accused husband and the deceased wife were together on the night of the death, though it is for the accused/husband to prove that the wife had committed suicide and had not been murdered, the reason for the suicide is not something which could be said to be within the special knowledge of the husband.

Education

In Ghalib Zeyad v. Jawaharlal Nehru University &Ors.,[68] the Delhi High Court, after having overruled the University’s stand on the merits, observed that when visually impaired persons attempt to overcome adversity through hard work and perseverance, then educational institutions should not adopt an obstructionist approach.

The Court in Katyan Shikshan Samiti v. Union of India & Ors.[69] cautioned that an unequipped medical college which does not have the requisite infrastructure, faculty, and patients, should not be granted conditional permission to admit students.

In a similar vein, in Gouri Devi Institute of Medical Sciences & Hospital v. Union of India & Anr.,[70] the Court held that when there were established deficiencies in relation to the faculty strength and the resident doctors strength, then the refusal to grant permission to the institution concerned to admit students cannot be sought to be assailed on technical grounds inasmuch as the authorities concerned have a duty to regulate and maintain educational standards.

Election Law

In Sanjay Gupta & Anr. v. Election Commission of India & Ors.,[71] the Court reiterated that the Election Commission of India and its functionaries are not proper parties to an election petition filed under the Representation of People Act, 1951, (‘RPA’) and are entitled to be deleted from the array of parties.

Insurance and Motor Vehicles Act

In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Phool Kumari & Ors.,[72] the Court issued innovative directions to ensure meaningful and holistic compensation to the insured who had suffered disability on account of the amputation of a limb. Not only was the quantum awarded towards fitment of a prosthetic limb upheld, the Court further directed that a motorized wheelchair should be made available to the insured so that it would enhance mobility and reduce dependence on an attendant.

In Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Arvind Kumar & Ors.,[73] the Court rejected a challenge to the genuineness of the insurance policy. The Court opined that when a cover note was issued by the insurance company’s agent, the seal of the insurance company also existed on the cover note and the handwriting of the insurance company’s agent had also not been challenged, then a bald statement by the insurance company that the policy was fraudulent could not be accepted.

Dr. Amit George is an Advocate practicing before the High Court of Delhi. The author would like to place on record his appreciation for the assistance provided by Mr. Rishabh Dheer, Mr. Amol Acharya and Mr. Bharat Rayadurgam, Advocates and Ms. Ramsha Mubin, Law Intern.

[1] Judgment dated 09.08.2019 in Ex. Pet. 99/2015

[2] Judgment dated 30.08.2019  in FAO (OS) (Comm.) 207/2019 (DB)

[3] Judgment dated 02.08.2019 in Arb. A. (Comm.) 61/2018

[4] Judgment dated 29.08.2019 in Arb. Pet. 485/2019

[5] Judgment dated 09.08.2019 in Arb. Pet. 381/2019

[6] Judgment dated 09.08.2019 in Arb. Pet. 402/2019 & O.M.P. (I) (Comm.) 201/2019

[7] Judgment dated 29.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 33/2019

[8] Judgment dated 05.08.2019 in C.M. (M) 264/2017

[9] Judgment dated 14.08.2019 in O.M.P. 466/2015

[10] Judgment dated 19.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 1105/2018

[11] Judgment dated 19.08.2019 in W.P. (Crl.) 2397/2018

[12] Judgment dated 01.08.2019 in CS (Comm.) 752/2018

[13] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 88/2016

[14] Judgment dated 28.08.2019 in C.M. (M) 569/2017

[15] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in R.S.A. 116/2018

[16] Judgment dated 05.08.2019 in C.S. (OS) 2111/2015

[17] Judgment dated 26.08.2019 in C.M. (M) 791/2019

[18] Judgment dated 13.08.2019 in C.S. (OS) 687/2017

[19] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in C.R.P. 37/2019

[20] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 205/2016

[21] Judgment dated26.08.2019 in C.M. (M) 1239/2019

[22] Judgment dated 28.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 1092/2018

[23] Judgment dated 20.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 1303/2018

[24] Judgment dated 28.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 34/2016

[25] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in C.S. (Comm.) 221/2016

[26] Judgment dated 02.08.2019 in O.M.P. 71/2012 & O.M.P. 452/2012

[27] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in CO. A. (SB) 33/2014

[28] Judgment dated 01.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 8071/2019 & W.P. (C) 8081/2019

[29] Judgment dated 22.08.2019 in C.M. 32308/2019 in W.P. (C) 7768/2019

[30] Judgment dated09.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 2994/2016

[31] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in W.P. Crl. 2140/2019 (DB)

[32] Judgment dated 23.08.2019 in W.P. (C) Crl. 3595/2017 (DB)

[33] Judgment dated 22.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 5259/2018

[34] Judgment dated 19.08.2019 in L.P.A. 458/2019

[35] Judgment dated 22.08.2019 in L.P.A. 686/2017 & L.P.A. 688/2017 (DB)

[36] Judgment dated 06.08.2019 in L.P.A. 509/2019 (DB)

[37] Judgment dated 28.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 747/2018 (DB)

[38] Judgment dated 14.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 8780/2019

[39] Judgment dated 01.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 8327/2019 (DB)

[40] Judgment dated 27.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 4208/2019

[41] Judgment dated 20.08.2019 in Bail Appln. 1987/2019

[42] Judgment dated 05.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 2827/2019

[43] (2017) 243 DLT 117 (DB)

[44] Judgment dated 22.08.2019 in Crl. A. 407/2019

[45] Judgment dated 08.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 4120/2016

[46] Judgment dated 28.08.2019 in L.P.A. 339/2009

[47] Judgment dated 22.08.2019 in Crl. A. 1315/2014 (DB)

[48] Judgment dated 02.08.2019 in Crl. A. 339/2004 (DB)

[49] Judgment dated 02.08.2019 in W.P. (Crl.) 1840/2019 (DB)

[50] Judgment dated 02.08.2019 in Crl. A. 1264/2018 (DB)

[51] Judgment dated 05.08.2019 in W.P. (Crl.) 3008/2018 (DB)

[52] Judgment dated 21.08.2019 in W.P. (Crl.) 1709/2019 (DB)

[53] Judgment dated 19.08.2019 in Crl. A. 1256/2014

[54] Judgment dated 14.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 829/2011

[55] Judgment dated 30.08.2019 in Crl. A. 174/2002 (DB)

[56] Judgment dated 29.08.2019 in Bail Appln. 1662/2019

[57] Judgment dated 27.04.2018 in Crl. A. 273/2007.

[58] Judgment dated 01.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 2594/2012

[59] Judgment dated 27.08.2019 in Crl. A. 229/2013

[60] Judgment dated 26.08.2019 in Crl. A. 599/2015

[61] Judgment dated 14.08.2019 in Crl. M.C. 3903/2019

[62] Judgment dated 30.08.2019 in Crl. L.P. 188/2018

[63] Judgment dated 29.08.2019 in Crl. L.P. 486/2019 (DB)

[64] Judgment dated 07.08.2019 in Crl. A. 1462/2012

[65] Judgment dated 21.08.2019 in Crl. A. 16/2002 (DB)

[66] Judgment dated 08.08.2019 in Crl. A. 782/2001 (DB)

[67] Judgment dated 30.08.2019 in Crl. A. 1199/2012 (DB)

[68] Judgment dated 05.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 9878/2018

[69] Judgment dated 21.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 8094/2019

[70] Judgment dated 30.08.2019 in W.P. (C) 6898/2019

[71] Judgment dated 20.08.2019 in El. Pet. 4/2019

[72] Judgment dated 26.08.2019 in Mac. App. 533/2017

[73] Judgment dated 19.08.2019 in Mac. App. 725/2019