In its endeavour to fill up gaps in legislation, the higher judiciary often has to exercise discretion while interpreting the law. This role comes with a responsibility, as the rulings of the Supreme Court and the High Court become precedent to be followed by courts in the future.

Article 141 of the Constitution of India states that “the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India”. Article 227 of the Constitution implicitly grants High Courts supervision over all courts and tribunals under their jurisdiction. These provisions ensure stability, predictability and equality in the Indian legal system.

When any conflict arises between two benches of a court, the judgment of the larger bench becomes binding. However, the courts often face the dilemma of choosing between two conflicting judgments passed by benches of equal strength. This article aims to highlight how courts have dealt with this predicament.

The courts have taken three approaches to such situations. Firstly, to follow the later judgment passed by the subsequent coordinate bench. Secondly, to follow the precedent that was set by the earlier coordinate bench, and thirdly, to follow the judgment which is more accurate and befitting to the case at hand.

Let us discuss judgments in which the first approach has been taken. In the case of Mattu Lal v. Radhey Lal (1974), the Supreme Court had noted that where there are two conflicting judgments of the same court, the later judgment would bind the court unless the earlier decision is of a larger bench. The Court has also clarified that this principle is not absolute and may not apply in certain situations. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Synthetics & Chemicals Limited (1991), the Court held,

“Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. Law declared is not that can be culled out but that which is stated as law to be accepted and applied.”

To summarise, the ‘later judgment binding’ approach will not apply when the later judgment is per incuriam, or passed without considering the relevant facts or law in existence.

The second approach is that the courts below are bound to follow the earlier precedent in case of conflict. In Sundeep Kumar v. State of Maharashtra (2014), the Supreme Court had observed that in case of conflict, the High Courts must follow the earliest view.

"It is often encountered in High Courts that two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest view as the succeeding ones would fall in the category of per incuriam," the Court said in this case.

Recently, in Geo Miller and Co. Private Limited v. UP Jal Nigam (2024), the Allahabad High Court held,

“The earlier judgement may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on the later bench of coordinate jurisdiction. The easy course of saying that earlier decision was rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved only in two ways- either to follow earlier decision or to refer the matter to a larger bench to examine the issue in case.”

The Supreme Court has also clarified in the recent case of UT of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (2023) that only because a review or reference to the larger bench has been pending against a judgment of the Supreme Court, the High Court cannot refuse to abide by its legally binding decision. In this regard, the Court also observed that:

“We make it absolutely clear that the High Courts will proceed to decide matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It is not open, unless specifically directed by this Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a review petition, as the case may be. It is also not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a judgement by stating that it has been doubted by a later Coordinate Bench. In any case, when faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier one which is to be followed by the High Courts...”

Another stance is that the courts would have the option to follow the judgment which one is more accurate and befitting. In the case of Atma Ram v. State of Punjab (1958), the Supreme Court had observed that “when a Full Bench of three Judges was inclined to take a view contrary to another Full Bench of equal strength, perhaps the better course would have been to constitute a larger Bench...otherwise the subordinate Courts are placed under the embarrassment of preferring one view to another, both equally binding on them."

Following the decision of Atma Ram, the Calcutta High Court in M Bholanath Karmakar v. Madanmohan Karmakar (1987) observed:

“We are, however, inclined to think that no blanket proposition can be laid down either in favour of the earlier or the later decision and, as indicated hereinbefore, and as has also been indicated by Court in Atma Ram (supra), the subordinate Court would have to prefer one to the other and not necessarily obliged, as a matter of course, to follow either the former or the later in point of time, but must follow that one, which according to it,is better in point of law. As old may not always be the gold, the new is also not necessarily golden and ringing out the old and bringing in the new cannot always be an invariable straight-jacket formula in determining the binding nature of precedents of coordinate jurisdiction.”

However, given the uncertainty surrounding these approaches, and the consequent confusion they cause, it is a preferred practice that when a bench of the Supreme Court is faced with conflicting decisions of co-equal benches, it refers the same to a larger bench. A division bench refers the matter to the Chief Justice for the formation of a three-judge bench, and a three-judge bench to a Constitution Bench of five judges and so on. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey (1961) had made the following observations,

"Law will be bereft of all its utility if it should be thrown into a state of uncertainty by reason of conflicting decisions, and it is therefore desirable that in case of difference of opinion, the question should be authoritatively settled. It sometimes happens that an earlier decision given by a Bench is not brought to the notice of a Bench hearing the same question, and a contrary decision is given without reference to the earlier decision. The question has also been discussed as to the correct procedure to be followed when two such conflicting decisions are placed before a later Bench….the better course would be for the Bench hearing the case to refer the matter to a Full Bench in view of the conflicting authorities without taking upon itself to decide whether it should follow the one Bench decision or the other."

Despite this stance being made clear, we often come across cases where the courts below take a different approach. One could also argue that the Supreme Court has itself been guilty of doing this. The Court's recent propensity to swiftly stay judgments of parallel benches has raised disturbing questions about the consistency and coherence of decisions, particularly those impacting citizens' liberty.

In Directorate of Enforcement (ED) v. Manpreet Singh Talwar (2023), a division bench of the Court effectively went on to stay another ruling in Ritu Chhabaria v. Union of India (2023), passed by a coordinate bench. In Ritu Chhabaria, the Court had ruled that filing of an incomplete chargesheet would not deprive an accused his right to default bail under Section 167(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This ruling was effectively stayed by a coordinate bench in Manpreet Singh Talwar, when it had directed all courts below to defer applications of default bail moved based on the Ritu Chhabaria judgment.

It is pertinent to note that the Central government had orally submitted that it was going to make an application seeking recall of the decision in Ritu Chhabaria. The Court in Manpreet Singh Talwar seemingly allowed the Centre’s recall (even before it made an application).

In this case, the coordinate bench in Manpreet Singh Talwar ought to have simply referred the issue to a larger bench instead.

More recently, in December 2023, a division bench of the Supreme Court in the case of RK Arora v. ED proceeded to dilute the dictum delivered two months prior (in October 2023) by another coordinate bench in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India. These cases dealt with the question of the ED's requirement to provide grounds of arrest to accused.

In Pankaj Bansal¸ it was held that under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), the ED must furnish the grounds of arrest in writing to the accused at the time of arrest. On the contrary, the bench in RK Arora held that the ED need not give the reasons for the arrest in writing to the accused at the time of the arrest, but within 24 hours of the arrest.

In both the cases, the accused persons were not given a copy of documents containing the grounds of their arrest.

While such arrest was declared illegal in Pankaj Bansal, no aspect of illegality in such arrest was found in RK Arora. The ruling in RK Arora, which weakens protections afforded to accused against arbitrary detention, demands closer examination.

In the recent past, coordinate benches of the Supreme Court have passed contradictory pronouncements on bail under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA). This year, on February 7, in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, a division bench of the Supreme Court had denied bail to a UAPA accused, stating,

“The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act."

Six months later, a coordinate bench of the Supreme Court in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India held that ‘bail as a rule’ is even applicable to special statutes like UAPA and liberty cannot be restrained if conditions for bail are met under the statute.

The recent stand-off between two coordinate benches of the Supreme Court in the tree-felling contempt case against the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is yet another example. Justice BR Gavai, who was heading a three-judge bench, said that simultaneous hearing by two benches on a similar issue could lead to contradictory orders which could then undermine the Court's authority and coherence.

This conflict arose when the three-judge bench was informed that a division bench (headed by Justice Abhay Oka) had also passed orders of contempt in the same matter. This conflict was referred to Chief Justice of India DY Chandrachud, who shifted the DDA tree-felling contempt matter to his own bench.

The trend of benches overturning decisions of other benches of equal strength results in inconsistency, affecting litigants and legal practitioners alike.

The Supreme Court stands as a ‘beacon of light’ to the courts below. Therefore, it should serve as an example to them by maintaining consistency, adhering to precedents and upholding judicial discipline and integrity to ensure uniform application of law.

Roshni Thakur is a final-year law student at Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow.

Anadi Tewari is a Correspondent at Bar & Bench. [He tweets @tiwari_ji_]

Views are personal.