On December 23 last year, Chief Justice G Rohini of the Delhi High Court issued a set of directions stating that the High Court Registry would no longer be accepting matters falling under the Explanation to Ss. 7 (1) and 8 of the Family Courts Act..So why have these matters been excluded from the original jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court? This is a direct result of the not-so-recent judgment in Amina Bharatram decided by Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and R.K. Gauba. This judgment was a consequence of a 2014 reference order made by Justice Manmohan Singh..But first the facts..In 2010, Amina Bharatram filed a maintenance suit, along with interim applications before the Delhi High Court. It was argued by the defendants that, as per the Family Courts Act of 1984, the High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear these applications. More specifically, S.7(1) ousted a number of matters from the jurisdiction of the High Court..Matters under the ‘Explanation’ of Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 include:.any proceeding relating to a marriage or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;any proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;any proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;any proceeding for maintenance;.Section 8 grants sole jurisdiction to the Family Courts over and above any district court or subordinate civil court for cases falling under the explanation cited above..In the final judgment [pdf] Justice Manmohan Singh stated that in the absence of an express exclusion of jurisdiction, the High Court’s ordinary original jurisdiction cannot be said to be ousted but also observed,.“…given the importance of the issues involved, it would be appropriate that the question of this court’s jurisdiction were ruled by a Division Bench.”.The issues before the Division Bench.The division bench was asked to examine the following questions of law:.With reference to Section (7)(1)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, whether the High Court is deemed to be a District Court while exercising Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction?Whether the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded by virtue of Ss. 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act?.The answer to the second question would be in the affirmative if the “district court” referred to in these provisions would include the High Court. In such a situation, the High Court’s jurisdiction, on the original civil side, would stand ousted; jurisdiction would vest with the designated family court..Arguments by the parties.Malavika Rajakotia, appearing for the plaintiff, had made three arguments – that the High Court should not abdicate its duty to rule upon crucial family law issues, that the specific legislation (Delhi High Court Act, 1966) should prevail over the general legislation (Family Courts Act, 1984) and that the powers mentioned under the two acts should be exercised concurrently.Dinesh Garg, appearing for the defendant argued that a special act provides for a special procedure for speedy settlement of disputes. Garg said that the objective of the Family Courts Act was to adopt an approach radically different from the procedure of civil courts in ordinary civil proceedings..The defendant also submitted that the term ‘High Court’ is used in the Act as a court of appeal which is evident from the fact that an appeal from a decision of the Family Court lies to the High Court, comprising of a bench of two or more judges (Section 19)..The analysis of the division bench.The bench recognized the main issue to be determined as to whether Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act oust the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court..The bench observed,.“The above provisions indicate that this Court’s original civil jurisdiction would be ousted if, and only if, the phrase ‘District Court’ can be interpreted to include ‘High Court’ (to the extent that the High Court is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction)”.It was argued by the defendant that since neither the Family Courts Act, nor the Code of Civil Procedure contains the definition of ‘District Court’, the definition of ‘District’ under S. 2(4) of the CPC should be relied upon according to which ‘District Court’ would include the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction..The bench stated,.“This Court agrees with the submissions made on behalf of the defendant. Section 2(4) of the CPC conclusively settles this issue. Although Section 2(4) does not expressly seek to define the term “District Court”, the meaning that emerges therefrom also includes the definition of “District Court”. This is because the term “District Court” is defined (in parenthesis) to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction that exercises such jurisdiction over a defined territory.”.Further,.“When it is clarified in Section 2(4) that ‘district’ would include the local limits of a High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction, axiomatically, such High Court would be a ‘District Court’ to the limited extent that it is exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.”.On the issue of which legislation would have an overriding effect, the bench agreed with the plaintiff’s submission that an earlier specific enactment would prevail over a subsequent legislation which is general in nature relying on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. The State of Maharashtra..However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the bench held that the specific enactment was the Family Courts Act and not the Delhi High Court Act..The bench held,.“This Court is of the opinion that it is the Family Courts Act, instead, which is specific in nature, as it seeks to constitute a special mechanism for adjudication of disputes of the nature enumerated in Section 7 of the Act. .On the other hand, the Delhi High Court merely provides for original civil jurisdiction of this Court based on a prescribed pecuniary limit, which is applicable to all civil suits.”.But what is also interesting about this judgment is that it discusses the “apprehension (if we may term it so)” of the Madras High Court in being “equated with a district court” vis-a-vis the decision in Mary Thomas. The court refers to the Bombay HC’s decision in Romila Jaidev Shroff v. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff which held that,.“…Everyone accepts the fact that the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to a limit and, therefore, that would be a District Court for the purpose of High Court in an exercise of that jurisdiction. .However, at the same time with equal striking uniformity, everywhere the learned Judges balk at an idea of treating the High Court as a District Court for all purposes of the Civil Procedure Code. In our opinion, this hesitation is uncalled for.”.Conclusion.The bench, therefore concluded that the Delhi High Court is a ‘District Court’ under the Family Courts Act to the extent that it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction and hence cannot hear cases referred to under Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act..Read the judgment below
On December 23 last year, Chief Justice G Rohini of the Delhi High Court issued a set of directions stating that the High Court Registry would no longer be accepting matters falling under the Explanation to Ss. 7 (1) and 8 of the Family Courts Act..So why have these matters been excluded from the original jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court? This is a direct result of the not-so-recent judgment in Amina Bharatram decided by Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and R.K. Gauba. This judgment was a consequence of a 2014 reference order made by Justice Manmohan Singh..But first the facts..In 2010, Amina Bharatram filed a maintenance suit, along with interim applications before the Delhi High Court. It was argued by the defendants that, as per the Family Courts Act of 1984, the High Court lacked the jurisdiction to hear these applications. More specifically, S.7(1) ousted a number of matters from the jurisdiction of the High Court..Matters under the ‘Explanation’ of Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 include:.any proceeding relating to a marriage or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;any proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;any proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;any proceeding for maintenance;.Section 8 grants sole jurisdiction to the Family Courts over and above any district court or subordinate civil court for cases falling under the explanation cited above..In the final judgment [pdf] Justice Manmohan Singh stated that in the absence of an express exclusion of jurisdiction, the High Court’s ordinary original jurisdiction cannot be said to be ousted but also observed,.“…given the importance of the issues involved, it would be appropriate that the question of this court’s jurisdiction were ruled by a Division Bench.”.The issues before the Division Bench.The division bench was asked to examine the following questions of law:.With reference to Section (7)(1)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, whether the High Court is deemed to be a District Court while exercising Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction?Whether the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court is excluded by virtue of Ss. 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act?.The answer to the second question would be in the affirmative if the “district court” referred to in these provisions would include the High Court. In such a situation, the High Court’s jurisdiction, on the original civil side, would stand ousted; jurisdiction would vest with the designated family court..Arguments by the parties.Malavika Rajakotia, appearing for the plaintiff, had made three arguments – that the High Court should not abdicate its duty to rule upon crucial family law issues, that the specific legislation (Delhi High Court Act, 1966) should prevail over the general legislation (Family Courts Act, 1984) and that the powers mentioned under the two acts should be exercised concurrently.Dinesh Garg, appearing for the defendant argued that a special act provides for a special procedure for speedy settlement of disputes. Garg said that the objective of the Family Courts Act was to adopt an approach radically different from the procedure of civil courts in ordinary civil proceedings..The defendant also submitted that the term ‘High Court’ is used in the Act as a court of appeal which is evident from the fact that an appeal from a decision of the Family Court lies to the High Court, comprising of a bench of two or more judges (Section 19)..The analysis of the division bench.The bench recognized the main issue to be determined as to whether Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act oust the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court..The bench observed,.“The above provisions indicate that this Court’s original civil jurisdiction would be ousted if, and only if, the phrase ‘District Court’ can be interpreted to include ‘High Court’ (to the extent that the High Court is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction)”.It was argued by the defendant that since neither the Family Courts Act, nor the Code of Civil Procedure contains the definition of ‘District Court’, the definition of ‘District’ under S. 2(4) of the CPC should be relied upon according to which ‘District Court’ would include the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction..The bench stated,.“This Court agrees with the submissions made on behalf of the defendant. Section 2(4) of the CPC conclusively settles this issue. Although Section 2(4) does not expressly seek to define the term “District Court”, the meaning that emerges therefrom also includes the definition of “District Court”. This is because the term “District Court” is defined (in parenthesis) to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction that exercises such jurisdiction over a defined territory.”.Further,.“When it is clarified in Section 2(4) that ‘district’ would include the local limits of a High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction, axiomatically, such High Court would be a ‘District Court’ to the limited extent that it is exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.”.On the issue of which legislation would have an overriding effect, the bench agreed with the plaintiff’s submission that an earlier specific enactment would prevail over a subsequent legislation which is general in nature relying on the recent Supreme Court judgment in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. The State of Maharashtra..However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the bench held that the specific enactment was the Family Courts Act and not the Delhi High Court Act..The bench held,.“This Court is of the opinion that it is the Family Courts Act, instead, which is specific in nature, as it seeks to constitute a special mechanism for adjudication of disputes of the nature enumerated in Section 7 of the Act. .On the other hand, the Delhi High Court merely provides for original civil jurisdiction of this Court based on a prescribed pecuniary limit, which is applicable to all civil suits.”.But what is also interesting about this judgment is that it discusses the “apprehension (if we may term it so)” of the Madras High Court in being “equated with a district court” vis-a-vis the decision in Mary Thomas. The court refers to the Bombay HC’s decision in Romila Jaidev Shroff v. Jaidev Rajnikant Shroff which held that,.“…Everyone accepts the fact that the Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to a limit and, therefore, that would be a District Court for the purpose of High Court in an exercise of that jurisdiction. .However, at the same time with equal striking uniformity, everywhere the learned Judges balk at an idea of treating the High Court as a District Court for all purposes of the Civil Procedure Code. In our opinion, this hesitation is uncalled for.”.Conclusion.The bench, therefore concluded that the Delhi High Court is a ‘District Court’ under the Family Courts Act to the extent that it exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction and hence cannot hear cases referred to under Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act..Read the judgment below